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The purpose of this thesis was to examine the behavior
of non-prior service personnel in the military based on age
at service entry. Crosstabulation and Multiple Classifica-
tion Analysis were used to study historical data on naval
personnel supplied by the Defense Manpower Data Center,
Monterey and survey information of DoD personnel gathered
by the Rand Corporation in 1978. Areas of study included
mental aptitude, length of service, contract preference,
occupational choice, first-term attrition, dependent status,
military compensation, re-enlistment and reserve entry intent
Perceptions of civilian employment, race relations, promo-
tion and military life were also investigated. Differences
between entry age cohorts were found in the areas of recruit
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A. THE PROBLEM AND PURPOSE
The military services have traditionally relied on indi-
viduals from younger age groups who are initially entering
the labor market to provide the required numbers of recruits
to maintain desired force levels. The 1980 's will have de-
clining sizes of the population age cohorts the United States
military has historically targeted as its' primary enlisted
age [Ref. 1]. This declining 18-21 year old pool may require
substantial increases in the percentages of Americans recruited
between the ages of 13 to 21,
In addition to decreased total numbers of individuals
available in the total enlistment supply pool, the supply of
high mental quality individuals may also be a future problem.
Fernandez's study of enlisted supply, [Ref. 2], projected
accessions in mental categories I and II to be only 56 per-
cent as great in 1984 as they were in the service's best
recruiting year since the end of the draft, FY76. (This
forecast was made with an assumed macroeconomic scenario of
a much improved economy.)
The available enlistment supply could be increased by
enlarging the current concept of recruit entry age cohorts
to include individuals in their mid-to-late twenties. In
addition to expanding the numbers of individuals considered
10

available for recruitment, the population of older individuals
may also provide a greater source of high quality recruits
than the younger aged cohorts traditionally targeted for
military recruitment programs. Analysis of the Vocational
Aptitude Battery administered in 1980 to a cross -section of
American youth aged 18 to 23 [Ref. 5], indicates that AFQT
test scores of the 1980 youth population are higher for the
older age groups. In addition, a United States Army Recruit-
ing Command Memorandum [Ref. 4], reports that individuals
over the age of 21 who join the Army are of substantially
higher mental aptitude than are 17-through-21 year old
entrants
.
Most current models of recruitment and first term behav-
ior of enlistees are predicated on the assumption that all
recruits are basically the same age. Differences in per-
ceptions and behavior of a wider age cohort could substan-
tially alter current manpower projections.
If one ascribes to theories of personality development
presented by Freud, Jung and Erikson among others, then age
can certainly be considered a factor in personality develop-
ment. Levinson, as discussed in Senger [Ref. 5], in 'lis
study of adult years divided life into four overlapping
periods: Childhood and Adolescence (up to twenty-two years
old); early adulthood (ages seventeen to fcrty-five); middle
adulthood (ages forty to sixty-five); and late adulthood
(age sixty onward). If one feels Levinson's theory has any
11

validity, then the services may be accessing individuals
from two different stages of personality development.
This study utilizes survey data compiled by the Rand
Corporation and historical personnel data held in Defense
r4anpower Data Center cohort files to examine the behavior
of individuals based on age at service entry. The analysis
vvfas conducted comparing data from behavioral and economic
indicators of cohorts stratified by age at service entry.
B. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
The military forces are authorized to access individuals
of ages 17-35. However, the accent on youth and vigor as a
desired trait of young recruits has ignored all but the
youngest age levels of manpower supply available to meet
DoD requirements. As illustrated by the following table
compiled by Binkin [Ref. 1], as far back as 1920, the military
establishment has relied on young people to provide the bulk
of the personnel for the military establishment. The median
age of the force has remained relatively constant over a
sixty-year period. During this period the military has under-
gone tremendous changes in areas such as tactics, weapon
system design and force composition. In 1920, 60 percent
of all enlisted men were in noncombatant jobs [Ref. 1].
At that time an argument for youth could be justified on the
grounds that these support troops could easily be integrated
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or gunner required for trench warfare were acquired in basic
training. This philosophy was still viable in World War II.
The romantic image of surrounded mechanics, clerks and
cooks of Bastone taking up rifles and holding off panzer
divisions still holds a certain fascination with the modern
military and public. In reality, however, the shipboard
40mm cannon that mess specialists were able to man in World
War II have been replaced by missile systems and computer
controlled gatling guns. Ashore, today's Army cook would
quickly discover that the anti-tank gun his World War II
counterpart found easy to man in the Ardennes has been re-
placed with TOW missiles.
The need for a youthful force is also a dubious require-
ment in view of the service's present reliance on the total
force concept. In the event of war, the subsequent mobili-
zation of selected and individual reserves would result in
the median age of the force increasing due to the influx of
large numbers of personnel, most of whom have already served
in the military and are already past the age of the present
targeted entry cohort of enlisted personnel. As reported
to the Armed Services Committee [Ret. 6], in the event of
intense combat expected in a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation,
about 200,000 additional men would be needed to replace
casualties during the four or five months before the army





In addition to the force aging due to wartime mobiliza-
tion, any program of lateral entry would result in a large
influx of older entrants which would also result in an older
force. Lateral entry does have certain attractions in an
all volunteer environment where comparability with the pri-
vate sector rather than conscription is the method of
obtaining recruits. Entry at other than the lowest level of
the military structure, 'vhile a break from traditional mili-
tary practice, would reduce training costs. As reported by
Muller [Ref. 7], the service's current methods of recruiting
candidates for technical ratings have contributed to the
development of personnel shortages. This has occurred at
the same tim.e the technical complexity of equipment has
increased, thus creating critical problems of both quality
and quantity recri-iting shortfalls.
The Navy has experimented with lateral entry through
the Direct Procurement Enlistment Program (DPEP) . In a
performance assessment of the FY 78/79 cohort by Biegler
[Ref. 8], DPEP was considered a viable means of providing
the Navy with skilled technicians. However, the DPEP FY
78/79 cohort contained only 120 individuals. Another study
which the Navy is conducting is the pilot program entitled
"Lateral Entry Accession Program, (LEAP)", which will target
13 Navy ratings for advanced placement entry of older enlist-
ees. The Navy intended to begin accession of lateral entrants
under LEAP in August of 1982 [Ref. 9].
15

Mobilization, changes in recruiting policy or the im-
plementation of lateral entry programs could result in recruit
cohorts that are significantly older than the average age of
individuals who are currently being recruited. Significant
variance in behavior or background related to entry age
could impact on present force policy. For example, differ-
ences in retention rates would affect future demand for
manpcv/er. This study examines survey and historical data
stratified by age at service entry of individuals who entered
the service since the advent of the AVF. While this study
does not examine the two other sources of potential enlisted
manpower supply, prior service individuals and the civilian
sector that chose not to enter the service, older aged en-
trants to the service do provide a sample of the behavior
and intentions of individuals who have been recruited into
the Services.
C. DATA BASES AND .ANALYSIS
The study employed two data bases: (i) historical data
from Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) files located at
Monterey, California, and (ii) the 19"^8 DoD Survey of Offi-
cers and Enlisted Personnel which was conducted as part of
the Rand Corporation's manpower, mobilization and readiness
program, sponsored by the Office of the Assistant Secretary
cf Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs § Logistics).
DMDC provided data on non-prior service individuals who
were in the Navy from fiscal year "9 through fiscal year 81
16

by accessing the DMDC active duty cohort file. The Navy was
selected as a prototypical service to inspect certain trends
in relation to entry age. The active duty cohort file pro-
vided the following information stratified by age at entry;
AFQT at entry for annual accessions of males and females to
the navy, length of estimated term of service contracts at
entry, cohort attrition rates and annual stocks in the par-
titicnment of ratings into the skill levels of semi -technical
,
technical and highly technical ratings; (see Appendix A for
a list of ratings in each group)
.
Historical information from DMDC was provided upon request
by the Naval Liaison Officer located at the DMDC office in
Monterey. The format for their analysis generally was cross
tabular with entry age as one of the variables of interest.
Documentation for the Rand survey is contained in [Ref.
10], which is the source utilized in the description of the
Rand survey data base. The DoD survey was administered to
personnel in all services and contains information to support
research in manpower issues such as retirement, pay, promo-
tion, retention and attitudinal factors on the military
environment. Four different questionnaires were used in
the survey. Forms one and two were administered to enlisted
personnel, and forms three and four were given to officers.
Form one asked questions concerning economic issues, re
-
enlistment options, retirement options and perceptions of
civilian opportunity. Form two asked questions concerning
17

military life such as rotation experience, promotions and
utilization of women. This study examined data from form
one and form two of the survey.
The Survey was issued in late January 1979, worldwide to
men and women in all four services. Data collection was
completed in June 1979.
The basic sample stratification variable for the survey
was service. Within each service, the enlisted samples were
further stratified by years of service. The enlisted sample
was further stratified by time remaining in enlistment con-
tract. Also, supplemental samples of enlisted women and
Blacks were selected to provide further analysis.
Three factors constrained the DoD sample design formu-
lated for the survey: the need for a statistically signifi-
cant number of usable responses from each stratification
cell, the expected response rate of sampled individuals and
budget limitations. Based on these constraints the sample
design for form one required 1,000 completed usable ques-
tionnaires from those respondents who were within one-year
of completing their enlistment term (ETS) and who had less
than five years of service and 1,000 completed usable ques-
tionnaires from those respondents who were within one-year
of ETS and who had between five and eight years of service.
In addition supplemental samples of enlisted females and
Blacks were required in order to produce a total of 500
usable questionnaires from each service for each of these
13

two groups. The response rate for form one was 108.9 per-
cent of the sample size requirement and form two response
was 106.2 percent of the sample size requirement.
Analysis of the unweighted 1978 DoD survey data was
carried out on the Naval Postgraduate School's IBM 3035
computer. The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences




II. FINDINGS FROM DMDC DATA
A. MENTAL APTITUDE
The DMDC Active Duty Cohort Tracking File was utilized
to look for differences in the quality of accessions as a
function of entry age. The Defense Manpower Data Center at
Monterey supplied crosstabular information on requested
variables and cell stratifications of interest. These were
then analyzed based on the criterion of proportional differ-
ences between the age cohorts in relation to the variable of
interest. The study employed data which were comprised of
all navy accessions from FY78 through FY81. For the purposes
of this study the measure of quality is the Armed Forces
Qualification Test (AFQT) . The AFQT is used to partition
individuals into mental categories I through V which are
used to determine eligibility for enlistment and to estab-
lish qualifications for assignment to specific military jobs.
Persons who score In categories I and II tend to be above
average in trainability ; those in categories IIIA and IIIB,
average; those in category IV, below average; and those in
category V, markedly beloiv average and, under current policy,
are not eligible for enlistment. The services prefer en-
listees in higher AFQT categories because training time and
associated costs are lower and these recruits are more
likely to qualify for specialized training in a greater
number of occupational areas [Ref. 3].
20

The DMDC data were used only on information available
on the Navy rather than for all the Services. Age differ-
ences by Service were not investigated. Therefore, the
results of this section should be viewed as indicative of
behavior trends and not considered a conclusive indicator
of behavior trends DoD wide. An analysis of all branches
may yield trends that are not revealed by the current analy-
sis. Most likely, some relationships of entry age may be
service specific.
The null hypothesis of no difference in AFQT scores of
naval personnel based on entry age was tested by the exami-
nation of all Navy accessions for FY79 through FY81. The
results of the analysis for males are presented in Table II
and in Table III for females.
Three different years were examined to insure any indi-
cated trends in AFQT scores existed over time and were not
peculiar to conditions that existed for only one fiscal
year. Also, male and female accessions were examined sep-
arately due to differences in recruiting policy based on
gender [Ref . 12]
.
Historical data indicated that for both males and fe-
males, on average, entry age is related to AFQT performance
Moreover, as entry age increased for both the male and
female cohorts, AFQT performance increased. Differences
between proportions of category I and II AFQT groups for




AFQT at accession, by Entry Age (Males), a. S. Navy
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AFQT at accession by Entry Age (Females), U.S. Navy
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17-19 20-21 22-24 25-35 Total
in AFQT
Group
IS II 29 37 43 52 35
III A 24 23 23 22 24
IIIB 30 27 22 19 27

















































in FY79 for males, and 35 to 55 percent for females. In
FY79, for example, the Navy accessed a total of 75,109
males. Thirty-five percent of those males were in mental
category I or II, 44% were in mental category III and 21%
were in mental category IV. Of those males accessed in
FY79 that were between the age of 25 to 55, 55% were in
mental category I or II, 55% were in mental category III
and only 12% were in mental category IV. In addition, even
in FY81, a year in which 69% of the total male accessions
were oi' mental category I or II, the older entry cohorts
were still above the mean with 70% of the 20-21 year olds
in mental category I and II, and 77% of the 25-55 year olds
in mental category I or II.
This pattern of increasing aggregate AFQT scores with
increasing entry age, indicated that, on average, older
entrants are better than 17-19 aged entrants based on this
measure of quality. The findings of the AFQT by entry age
analysis were based on the set of total navy accessions
over three fiscal years.
B. PREFERRED ENLISTMENT CONTRACT LENGTH
An important factor in the initial enlistment decision
affected by entry age may be length of time an individual
is willing to serve on an enlistment contract. While most
initial service obligations are for four years of service,
six year initial service contracts are required for ratings
24

requiring extensive technical training. Individuals who
obligate for an additional two years of service trade the
greater flexibility of a four year contract for the increased
level of technical training obtained through a six year
obligation. The results of crosstabulation of the length
of the initial estimated term of service (ETS) contract by
entry age, presented in Table IV, indicated that for all
navy accessions from FY78 through FY81 the 22-24 and 25-55
entry age cohorts had a greater propencity to enlist for
four-year ETS contracts than the two younger entry age cohorts
Differences between 17-21 and 22-55 aged entrants indi-
cated a pattern of preference for four-year service obliga-
tions for the four years examined, FY78 through FY81. This
pattern of preference for four-year ETS contracts was most
pronounced for the oldest entry age cohort from FY79 through
FY81.
If the length of obligated service alone resulted in the
higher percentage of older entrants in four-year ETS con-
tracts in comparison to the younger age cohorts, then any
change in service policy that would allow shorter length of
initial obligated service contracts could increase the per-
centages of older aged entrants to the N'avy. However,
required length of service is also a function of occupational
choice. For example, ratings in the advanced electronic
and advanced technical field require six-year ETS contracts.




Estimated Term of Service (ETS) length by Entry Age
FY 78





















_ _ _ .
y





17-19 20-21 22-24 25-35 Total
L en gt h of
E75
Four Year '
ETS 78 73 80 31 73
Six Year
ETS 22 22 20 19 22
?ctal
in Age 55881 11700 6273 2698 76 552
Cohort
FY 30
Age a t Ent ^7
17-19 20-21 22-24 25-35 Total
Length of
Four Year
ETS 83 83 84 86 33
Six Year
ETS 17 17 16 14 1 7
To?"aI r








ETS 83 32 85 84 83
Six Year
ETS 17 18 17 16 17
in Age
Cohort
59600 16201 8801 4713 I 393 1
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under the age of 24 [Ref. 12]. Further study that would
control or separate the effects of occupational choice
would be required to confirm the effect of service contract
length on the enlistment decision
C. OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE
The all volunteer force allows individuals who enlist
in the service to select not only the branch of service an
individual prefers but also allows an individual a selection
of occupations within the service. Occupational choice is
a function of personal preferences, the physical and mental
requirements for the desired rating and the number of train-
ing billets available for the desired occupation. An in-
dividual has the option of not enlisting or postponing the
enlistment decision if the desired occupation is not avail-
able at the time he is making the enlistment decision at the
recruiting station.
The DMDC Active Duty Cohort Tracking file was used to
test the null hypothesis that there is no difference on the
basis of entry age as to what rating individuals are assigned
Ratings were grouped by skill categories and by length of
initial obligation. Due to differences in the length of
training pipe-lines for various Navy ratings and the subse-
quent differences between the time of accession and the
awarding of a rating, annual accession or personnel flow
information were not considered appropriate for the analysis.
27

The end strengths for each fiscal year were utilized to pro-
vice a "shap-shot" of the total numbers of individuals in
each of 96 navy ratings used in the analysis. This study,
therefore, made no allowances for length of service. Navy
rate or what enlistment contract the individuals were serv-
ing at the end of the fiscal year.
The cohort data contained both males and females. The
limited billets available for women in ratings which tradi-
tionally entail a high proportion of sea duty would affect
female assignment. This analysis also did not account for
differences in required and actual manning levels of each
rating. The assignment decision would be affected by the
greater need to fill ratings that were critically under-
manned than to fill those ratings that were not experiencing
manning problems.
The analysis grouped 96 Naval Ratings into three catego-
ries of skill requirements. While these three groupings
simplify the presentation of the analysis results, the re-
duction of rating categories from 96 to 5 masks much of the
complexity in the selection process to individual ratings.
Even in view of the above mentioned factors which tend
to mask factors in the selection of individuals to ratings,
the results of the analysis, presented in Table V, indicate
that entry age may be a factor in what rating individuals
enter. (See Appendix A for a listing of ratings by skill




Eating Classification by Entry Age
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FY 79
Age at Entry





Technical 17 16 18 17 17
Technical 72 71* 73 73 72
High-
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Technical 63 55 64 62 63
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the percentage of the 22-24 and 25-35 aged entrants were
equal or abo\'e the percentage of total individuals in the
semi -technical ratings and below the percentage of total
individuals in the high- technical ratings.
In view of the demonstrated superiority of older entrants
in terms of AFQT scores found in the previous analysis, it
was anticipated that larger proportions of the older entrants
would be in the high- technical category in comparison to
the younger entrants. This analysis indicated that the re-
verse is true. This may indicate that, while on average
the older entrants are in higher AFQT groups, older entrants
are assigned to ratings that, in the aggregate, require the
lowest AFQT scores. If this pattern does exist, then the
Navy is not optimally using the capabilities of older entrants
Another possible explanation for older entrants occupy-
ing an equal or higher proportion of semi -technical Navy
ratings in relation to younger entrants may be a preference
for shore duty. Older entrants may prefer clerical duties
that are inherent in some semi -technical ratings and may
join the Navy on the condition they are assigned to these
ratings. Further analysis of the distribution of age in
individual semi - technical ratings would be required to con-
firm the conjecture. Some semi - technical ratings. Boatswain's
Mate for example, entail a large amoung of physical labor
and time at sea. In terms of job description, such ratings
are not equivalent to other semi- technical ratings such as
Yeoman or Personnelman , which are more sedentary in nature.
30

To investigate preferences of enlistees for different lengths
of ETS contracts, t;vo further crosstabulations of end
strengths as of FY81 were made. These were done using the
DMDC Cohort Tracking file to separate the ratings that re-
quire six-year ETS contracts from those that require four-
year ETS obligations. (See Appendix A for a listing of
ratings requiring four-year and six-year initial ETS con-
tracts by skill category.) While this analysis did not
control for such administrative effects as the oldest entry
age cohort being limited from entry into nuclear field rat-
ings [Ref. 12], the results of the crosstabulations indicated
differences in the proportions of individuals in skill cate-
gories based on entry age. The results of the analysis are
presented in Table VI for those of four-year ETS contracts,
and in Table VII for those of six-year ETS contracts.
TABLE VI
RATING CLASSIFICATION (4 ETS) BY ENTRY AGE
("o of Age Cohort in Classification Group)
FY 81 Age at Entrv
Technical
Classif icati on
17-1 9 20-21 22-24 25-35 Total
Semi -
Technical 24 25 28 29 25
Technical 71 71 68 67 71
High-




41927 7 37158 22595 12279 191284
31

The analysis of end strengths as of FY81 indicated that
the 22-24 and 25-35 aged entrants held high technical skill
category ratings in lower percentages of the age cohort than
the 17-19 age entrants for those individuals serving on a
four-year ETS contract. However, those individuals serving
on six-year ETS contracts had larger percentages of the
22-24 and 25-55 entry age cohorts in high skill category
ratings in relation to the 17-19 vear entrants. This indi-
cates that wliile previous analysis indicated older individuals
enlist in larger proportions for four-year ETS contracts
than the younger entrants, older entrants who do enlist for
six-year ETS contracts enlist in the high technical skill
ratings in much greater proportions than do the younger
entrants that also enlist for six-year ETS obligations. The
current analysis is further complicated by noting that the
results of Table VII imply that over 50 percent of the over-
20 entry aged groups were in six-year ETS ratings while less
than 15 percent of the 17-19 entry aged cohort were in six-
year ETS ratings in FY81. Further analysis needs to be done
to distinguish the time horizon choices from the occupational
skill choices.
The higher average AFQT scores of the older entry cohorts
than the younger entrants would enable greater numbers of
older entrants to meet the high mental requirements for the
high technical ratings. Possibly, attrition from training




RATING CLASSIFICATION (6 ETS) BY ENTRY AGE
(% of Age Cohort in Classification Group)
FY 81 Age at Entry
Technical 17-19 20-21 22-24 25-55 Total
Classification
Semi-
Technical 17 16 14 17 16
Technical 44 45 45 55 44
High-
Technical 39 59 41 50 40
Total
in Age 75229 19148 10799 4418 107594
Cohort
result in larger percentages of older entrants, in compari-
son to the younger cohorts, being awarded high technical
ratings. Also, occupational selection may be a factor in
the different behavior of four-year ETS and six-year ETS
contract preferences of older aged entrants. Older entrants
may prefer an initial term of service of only four years.
Older entrants that do obligate themselves for a six-year
ETS contract may have a tendency to do so because of a per-
ception of increased civilian marketability from the acqui-
sition of skills in high- technical ratings such as electronics
and data systems. Again, future study in this area would
be required to confirm this supposition.

D. FIRST TERM ATTRITION
Another measure of performance is the attrition rate
during a term of enlistment. Attrition before reaching the
end of a contractual obligation is detrimental to the mili-
tary not only from the aspect of loss of personnel to meet
grade level requirements, but also is a loss of potential
return on investment in personnel training.
DMDC attrition data were used to compile the percentage
of survivors for the FY78 all navy accession cohort strati-
fied by entry age. The survival data for the cohort com-
posed of individuals enlisting for four years of obligated
service are presented in Table VIII and the survival data
for the cohort of those enlisting for six years of obligated
service are presented in Table IX. Information was availa-
ble for the two obligated service cohorts only through 48
months of service. So ivhile the four year estimated time
in service (ETS) cohort was at the end of the obligated
service contract, those with six-year ETS contracts had two
years remaining before they would reach the end of required
obligated service.
The analysis of those with four-year ETS obligations
indicated a pattern of decreasing attrition through age 24.
However, after age 24 the attrition rate increased by approx
imately five percent. The oldest entry age cohort had the





FY78 ACCESSION COHORT SURVIVOR RATES (4 ETS)










100 100 100 100
6 88.68 87.41 89.63 85.90
12 85.61 84.41 88.02 81.55
18 82.69 81.31 84.72 77.91
24 79.95 79.06 82.00 75.33
30 77.48 76.92 77.46 73.08
36 74.83 74.95 75.77 71.03
48 72.84 73.45 74.00 69.28
TABLE IX
FY78 ACCESSION COHORT SURVIVOR RATES (6 ETS)









100 100 100 100
6 89.20 87.50 8 9.09 86.69
12 86.46 84.19 86.52 33.78
18 83.90 81.85 84.21 80.24
24 80.62 79.74 82.06 77.75
30 77.96 78.09 80.77 74.84
36 75.23 76.41 78.79 74.22
48 73.81 75.53 77.85 73.59

The analysis cf those with an initial six-year ETS obli-
gation indicated that after 48 months o£ service, approxi-
mately 78 percent of the 22-24 aged entrants were still on
active duty. The pattern was the same as for four-year ETS
contracts: decreasing attrition with increasing entry age
up through the third age cohort, then increased attrition
for the oldest age cohort. However, the lowest percentage
of survivors in the six-year ETS cohort, (the 25-35 year
olds at 73 percent), was competitive, with the best percent-
age of survivors of the four-year ETS cohort, (the 22-24
year olds) . This may be due to the higher entry requirements
inherent in entry to ratings which require a six-year enlist-
ment obligation. The higher standards of entry may be a
factor in reduced attrition during the first enlistment
contract. The 22-24 year entrants who entered the Navy
appear to be the most desirable considering their attrition
rates for both four and six-year obligated service contracts.
While those individuals who entered into officer programs
should be considered as a loss from the enlisted rolls, such
movement into the officer ranks indicates these individuals
were highly desirable performers. Movement into officer
programs was, therefore, not counted as attrition. The
percentage of the age cohort that accessed to officer entry
programs during each six month length of service increment





FY 7 8 ACCESSION COHORT ENTRY TO OFFICER PROGR.A1MS
(four year ETS)
Total four vear ETS accessions: 62,247
Length of
Service Entry Age
(months) 17-19 20-21 22-24 25-35
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
6 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00
12 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00
18 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.00
24 0.12 0.05 0.14 0.10
30 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.10
36 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.00








FY7 8 ACCESSION COHORT ENTRY TO OFFICER PROGRAMS
(SIX YEAR ETS)








0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
12 0.37 0.09 0.00 0.00
18 0.53 0.00 0.09 0.00
24 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.00
30 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
36 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00




programs 1.02 0.14 0.18 0.00
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The highest numbers of accessions to officer entry
programs for both four-year ETS and six-year ETS cohorts
were in the 17-19 entry age cohort. This may be due to
specific service policy or older individuals may enter offi-
cer programs predominately through officer entry programs
that require a college degree prior to entry.
An analysis of the reasons for separation prior to com-
pletion of obligated service of the FY78 accession cohort
was conducted to determine the factors that resulted in the
different attrition rates of the entry age cohorts. The
result of the analysis of reasons for separation for the
FY78 four and six-year ETS cohorts is presented in Table XII.
Service separations were grouped into six categories:
medical, hardship, death, officer entry, failure to meet
minimum performance and behavioral standards, and other
separations. (See Appendix B for a listing of subgroupings
which made up these categories.)
For both the four and six-year ETS cohorts the categories
of medical disqualification and failure to meet minimum
behavioral or performance criteria were the major factors
that affected the variance between attrition percentages of
the entry age cohorts. As entry age increased, the percen-
tage of individuals discharged due to medical problems
increased. The incidence of medical discharge more than
doubled from the lowest to the highest cohort. Medical




REASONS FOR DISCHARGE BEFORE ETS
il of accessants lost for the indicated reasons)







Medical 2. CO 2.54 2.75 4.54
Hardship 0.18 0.50 0.40 0.49
Death 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.44
Officer Entry 0.41 0.19 0.52 0.20
Failure to meet
minimum standards 19.95 17.72 16.55 19.17
Other 4.51 5.66 6.07 6.10
TOTAL 27.20 26.75 26.25 50.94
FY78 six year ETS
Discharge Age at Entrv



































current standards in regards to age possibly could be relaxed
without a serious degradation to the force [Ref. 1]. Further
analysis is needed to determine what type of physical stan-
dard is not being met.
The largest variance between the cohorts occurred under
the category of failure to meet minimum performance or be-
havioral standards. For the four-year ETS cohort the
youngest and the oldest entrants had the highest rates of
discharge for this reason. The 22-24 entry cohort had the
lowest rate of discharge at 16.55 percent, approximately
three percent lower than the 17-19 entry cohort rate. A
different pattern of variance existed for the six-year ETS
individuals. As entry age increased, the percentage of
discharges decreased. The discharge rate dropped from
approximately 20.5 percent for the youngest entrants to
approximately 15.25 percent for the 22-55 age cohort. This
may indicate that, on average, older entrants may be of high
quality in comparison to other entry age cohorts in this
regard. The oldest entrants who join the navy for four-
year obligations, however, may on average be uncompetitive
in the civilian labor market and could view the navy as
employment of last resort. Of note, the age cohort that
contained the highest oercentage of individuals who failed
to meet minimum standards was for both ETS cohorts
,
the




A complete analysis of entry age effects would need to
focus on the civilian employment experience of each age
cohort. In particular, we would like to ascertain how each
cohort compares to its peers who do not enter the military.
The prefered target recruiting population may very well be
one that is not currently participating at very high rates
in military employment.
The next chapter studies other background variables as
well as perceptions and differences in intent based on entry




III. FINDINGS OF RAND POD SURVEY
A. METHODOLOGY
The data base was adjusted to include only those indi-
viduals who accessed to the service after 1973. This elimi-
nated any possibility of a conscription environment
influencing the responses of individuals.
The sample was partitioned by age at service entry and
analyzed using multiple classification analysis (MCA) [Ref.
11]. MCA was used to control for the variables of sex, race,
the enlistment contract the respondent was serving at the
time of the survey, and the branch of service the respondent
entered. In addition to adjusting for the variance of con-
trol variables and the interactions between the control
variables and the survey questions, the MCA program computed
the number of valid survey responses vvhich made up the sample
size for each individual question. The MCA program also
computed the level of statistical significance based on the
F-test and degrees of freedom for each sample size in the
analysis. The F-test is a statistical method of deciding
whether data do or do not come from the same normal popula-
tion. The procedure was used to test the null hypotheses
of no significant difference between age at entry cohorts
in their response to questions in a number of categories.
The categories are presented in Table XIII.

TABLE XIII
DoD SURVEY AREAS OF ANALYSIS
A. Individual characteristics
B. Reserve/Guard intentions
C. Perceptions concerning military compensation and
benefits
D. Perceptions of civilian employment
E. Perception of military life
F. Perception of race relations
G. Perception of military retirement
H. Perception of promotion
I. Re-enlistment intent
J. Years of service intended
Three groupings were used for race: Black, Oriental
and White. The Oriental classification includes those of
Asian, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Filipino and Pacific
Island origin. Due to small samples, other racial groups
were not included in the analysis. Enlistment contract
was separated into the first enlistment contract or "careerist"
contract, if serving on a second or third enlistment con-
tract at the time of the survey. It must be emphasized that
none of the members of our "careerist" group had more than
five years of military employment.
A study of individual characteristics stratified by
entry age was conducted to provide a historical description
of the Rand survey data. Age was analyzed by sex, race,
enlistment contract serving at the time of the survey, and
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military branch which the respondent accessed. The results
of the study are presented in Table XIV.
TABLE XIV
ENTRY AGE BY SEX, RACE, TERM OF ENLISTMENT,
AND MILITARY BRANCH
Sample Mean = 19.01 years old at entry





























On average, the survey data indicated that females
accessed at an older age than males. Orientals joined the
service at an older age than blacks and whites. Individuals
who joined the Air Force and Army were slightly older than
those who joined the Marines and Navy. A similar pattern
was found in a telephone survey of civilian males, aged
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25-29, conducted by the Naval Personnel Research Data Center
(NPRDC) [Ref. 15]. The telephone survey found interest in
possible enlistment in the Air Force and Army over the Navy
or Marines amongst ncn-prior service males in the civilian
sector to increase with the respondents' age. If such a
behavioral trend is a significant factor in enlistment deci-
sions, demographic shifts in the population age may have
greater impact on the Marines and Navy than the Air Force
and Army.
Current regulations allow entry into any one of the four
services when the otherwise qualified person is between the
ages of 17-55 [Ref. 12]. We grouped this range of author-
ized ages into four age-at-entry cohorts: 17-19, 20-22,
25-24, 25-55 years of age. These four cohorts were selected
after initial exploratory analysis employing ten entry age
cohorts indicated a general pattern of change with age at
entry that is revealed by the grouping of ages into a smaller
number of cohorts. The loss of detail in the age stratifi-
cation is more than compensated by the ease of understanding
gained by the use of four age cohorts. If Levinson's theory
of male personality is correct, then the four age cohorts
would differ in average response from the ages of 17 to 55.
The results of the survey should be viewed with the
following caveat. According to Aizen and Fishbein [Ref. 14],
an individual's intention is generally the immediate and
most accurate determinant of behavior under several conditions
46

There must be correspondence between the measure of inten-
tion and measure of behavior as to the target (i.e. the job),
the action (i.e. recruitment), the time frame, and the con-
text. The context is the military for the purpose of this
analysis. Intentions change over time. The longer the
time interval, the less accurate is the prediction of behav-
ior from intention. Aggregate intentions are much more
stable than individual intentions over time, because incidents
that affect individuals are likely to balance out at the
aggregate level. Predictions of behavior from intentions
at the aggregate level are therefore remarkably accurate.
Variations in behavior for entry age cohorts should not
be considered an absolute measurement. In the aggregate,
however, the variations in response to questions exhibited
by the cohorts indicates trends in behavior. Significant
variation in response to questions of an economic or behav-
ioral nature may indicate that age at service entry is a




The first application of multiple classification analysis
(MCA) is years of education received at the time of service
entry, as presented in Table XV. The results listed under
control variables are unadjusted for variation caused by





Sample Mean = 12.12 years
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entry age. The variables utilized as control variables are
the attributes upon which the stratified sampling occurred.
The result listed under Adjusted Education by Entry Age
,
is
the average educational level of each entry age cohort ad-
justed for variation associated with interactions with the
control variables. For example, the variation in educational
attainment associated with gender is isolated and controlled,
and therefore is not determining the indicated variation
between the entry age cohorts. The Unadjusted Education by
Entry Age results are included in this first table to illus-
trate the difference in result when variation of the control
variables are controlled.
All independent variables used as controls as well as
the age cohorts were found to have significant differences
at the .001 level. As entry age increases, the level of
education increases.
The Profile of American Youth Survey indicated a similar
trend in AFQT scores in the civilian youth population [Ref.
3]. These results indicate that the present target age
group for enlisted supply, ages 19-21, may not be the optimal
target age category to access in terms of mental quality.
As discussed by Coleman and Toomepuu, [Ref. 4], recruitment
of older aged individuals may improve the average mental
quality of recruits.
The finding that females who access to the services have
a higher average level of educational attainment is probably
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the result of smaller sized recruit goals and subsequent
higher entrance requirements for females than their male
counterparts [Ref. 12]. Likewise, screening procedures and
individual service requirements may explain some of the
variance of educational attainment of Air Force and Navy
recruits in comparison to Army and Marine Corps recruits.
Analysis of the parents' education of respondents, shown
in Tables XVI and XVII, indicate that parental education is
sensitive to all of our control variables as well as entry
age. The Profile of American Youth Study
,
[Ref. 3], argued
that mother's education has a stronger relationship to a
child's level of attainment than does the father's education.
Parent's education declined as the cohort entry ages
increased. This pattern is inversely related to the educa-
tion attainment level of the age cohorts themselves , in
which education attainment increased at service entry age.
A possible explanation of this pattern could be that, on
average, older aged individuals from lower socio-economic
backgrounds, indicated by lower educational levels of the
parents, view the military as a better vehicle than availa-
ble civilian options for a desired career opportunity.
However, future study in this area would be required to
validate this conjecture.
The upward mobility of American society is indicated by
the higher level of education for respondents as compared





Sample Mean = 11.88 Years
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attainments of the three racial categories may illustrate
the effects of equal opportunity programs for minorities
over the last decade. The gap between parents' and their
childrens' level of educational attainment closed for the
three racial categories used in the analysis.
Table XVIII presents the results of the analysis of the
number of members of the respondents' family who also had
served in the military. Careerists had a greater percentage
of immediate family members who had served in the military
than did those respondents who were serving on an initial
enlistment contract. This difference was statistically
significant at the .001 level. The pattern of individuals
exhibiting higher rates of career behavior when other family
members had served in the military has recently been dis-
cussed by Hunt [Ref. 15].
As one would expect, analysis of marital status at
service entry, presented in Table XIX, indicated a pattern
of increasing percentages of older age cohorts being married.
The 17-19 entry age cohort, on average, reported a marriage
rate of six percent compared to thirty-four percent for those
individuals in the 22-2-1 entry age cohort and forty-two
percent for individual's in the 25-55 entry age cohort.
The rapid increase in the percentage of married individ-
ual's with increasing age, a threefold increase between the
17-19 and 20-21 age cohorts, for example, indicates that




NUMBER OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY MEMBERS WHO SERVED
IN THE MILITARY
Sample Mean = 1.42 family members also served

































MARITAL STATUS AT ENTRY
Co X 100)
Sample Mean = 11% married
































recruitment will result in large increases in requirements
for dependent support. Any policy which would result in
increased percentages of service personnel with families
may have important policy implications in areas such as
housing, base support, health care and moving allowances.
The individual missions of the services may also be a
factor into which branch individuals access. The Air Force
and Armv accessions had much higher rates of marriage than
did accessions to the Navy and Marine Corps. Family separa-
tions inherent to sea duty may be a factor in the enlistment
decision for married individuals. The Navy and Marines may
be at a disadvantage in this regard in competing with the
Air Force and Army for older aged recruits.
In addition to an increase in the percentage of respon-
dents with spouses as entry age increases, the number of
dependents other than spouse also increases with age. As
illustrated in Table XX, the average number of dependents
excluding a spouse is 0.58 for the 17-19 entry age cohort,
and exactly one dependent for the 25-55 entry age cohort.
The high average number of dependents for Orientals
compared with Blacks and Whites may be due to cultural and
religious factors. The differences in the average number
of dependents between first enlistment and career individuals
is most likely due to careerists having a longer length of




NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS EXCLUDING SPOUSE
Sample Mean = 0.45 dependents
Control Variables Sample Number Significance





























This does indicate that higher rates of retention of indi-
viduals with an older entry age may also increase the variable
costs associated with dependent support.
In summary, the analysis of descriptive variables based
on entry age indicate that significant differences exist
between recruits when they are stratified by age at service
entry. These differences are present in marital status and
the number of dependents service mem.bers have in their house-
holds. Additionally, significant differences were found in
the level of education attained by both the respondents and
their parents, race, and the service into which individuals
enter based on service entry age. These differences indi-
cate changes in recruitment policy altering the present age
distribution of recruits could have a significant affect on
quality, attainment of individual service recruiting goals
and dependent costs for the force.
C. RESERVE/GUARD INTENTIONS
As reported by Coffey [Ref. 5], reserves and national
guard units are important components of the total force
concept. The reserves and national guard units are tasked
with providing rapid re-enforcement to regular forces in the
event of conventional war. Binkin states [Ref. 16], that
the all -volunteer armed force affects reserve forces in two
ways. They have become the primary source for augmenting
the active forces with the end of conscription. At the same
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time, however, the lessening o£ draft pressures raises the
question as to whether enough volunteers can be attracted
into the reserves.
The supply of prior-service individuals has also de-
clined due to both the volunteer force and cutbacks in active
duty strength since the end of the Vietnam war. Higher
retention rates in the regular forces coupled with fewer
numbers of individuals entering the regular forces has exac-
erbated the problem of meeting reserve recruitment goals due
to a smaller available supply pool of prior- service individuals
Differences among entry age cohorts in propensity to join a
reserve or national guard unit after leaving the regular
forces would impact on the supply of prior- service individu-
als available for duty in the reserve component of the total
force
.
The analysis of intent to join either the reserves or
national guard upon completion of duty in the regular forces
is presented in Table XXI. Again, the response based on
intent should be viewed within the perspective of previously
mentioned factors concerning an individual's response to
survey questions. So while the actual percentages of indi-
viduals can not be accurately determined by a questionnaire,
the trends of the age cohorts in the analysis indicate that
as entry age increases the propensity to join a reserve or
national guard unit upon leaving the service increases.









































interested in duty in the reserves would increase if changes
in recruitment policies increased the present age composi-
tion of recruits
.
All control variables were found to be significant at
the .001 level. Service females had a higher level of re-
cruitment intent than service males. Minorities had a higher
interest than Whites. Careerists, individuals classified
as satisfied with military life in that they remained in the
service beyond their initial enlistment contract, also ap-
peared to have a greater interest than their first-term
counterparts to remain in the service on a part-time basis
if thev left the regular service before retirement. The
pattern of response to the service cohorts was also of
interest. While in previous analysis of promotion percep-
tion, intended length of service and re -enlistment intent;
Air Force response was generally higher than the other
services. In the area of reserve intent, the Air Force was
well below the other services in positive intent.
The relationship between interest in serving in an in-
active reserve status and monetary incentives was inspected
by analysis of response to a scenario in which a 200 dollar
annual bonus would be awarded to individuals who remained
in the individual ready reserve upon com.pletion of duty in





YEARS REMAINING IN INACTIVE RESERVE
FOR A $200 ANNUAL BONUS
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Entry age was significant at the .059 level. The two
older age cohorts indicated an aggregate intention to remain
in the individual ready reserve (IRR) approximately three
months longer than the younger entry age cohorts. While
this is probably not an accurate estimate of the actual time
span an individual would serve in the IRR if placed in this
scenario, it is significant that the trends in response
indicated older aged entrants profess a higher interest in
such a program.
The control variable of race indicated that Whites had a
greater interest in the 200 dollar bonus scenario than the
two minority cohorts. This is the opposite pattern indi-
cated in the previous analysis of interest in joining a
reserve or national guard unit. This may indicate that
minorities, on average, are more responsive than Whites to
the greater monetary compensation of part-time duty in the
active reserves in lieu of a much smaller monetary compen-
sation, albeit without weekend drills, in the inactive
reserves
.
In summary. Entry age appears to be a factor in intent
to enlist in the reserves or national guard upon completion
of duty in the regular forces. Older age recruits appear
to have both a greater intent to join such units upon com-
pletion of duty and also exhibit a greater interest in
remaining in the IRR for a small annual bonus.

D. MILITARY COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
An individuals' level of monthly military compensation
is not computed solely on the basis of paygrade and length
of service. It is also based on an individual's marital
status, location, and type of duty. A serviceman's career
path and personal circumstance tend to make the level of
monthly compensation unique for each individual. Therefore,
the sample of military compensation of individuals who en-
tered the service from 1975 through 1978 may be more robust
than one unfamiliar with the complexity of the military
compensation system would expect.
The analysis of total perceived monthly military compen-
sation is presented in Table XXIII. The analysis employed
the respondent's perceived level of compensation in 1979
rather than the actual level of compensation as calculated
by DoD.
If service personnel are viewed as individuals who make
rational economic decisions, based on pecuniary information
at their disposal, then the perceived level of compensation
may be a more accurate determinate of behavior than actual
compensation.
The assumption was made that due to the higher expected
earnings of the 22 to 55 age cohorts over the 17-21 year
olds in the civilian sector [Ref. 17], older aged recruits
to the military would either have or perceive a higher level




TOTAL MONTHLY MILITARY COMPENSATION
(annual pay in dollars)
Sample Mean - 76 8
Control Variables Sample Deviation Significance















































the older entrants were economically competitive. The older
aged cohorts indicated a significantly higher level of
monthly compensation than the younger entrants. This was
expected since DoD pays increased compensation in the form
of basic allowance for quarters (BAQ) to married service
members. Earlier analysis indicated that the percentage of
married recruits increased with entry age. Also, male per-
sonnel and airmen indicated higher rates of marriage than
the rest of their respective cohorts. So different marital
rates and the subsequent different level of BAQ may also
explain some of the difference in reported monthly compensation
In an attempt to isolate the factor of marital status on
the total level of monthly compensation, the analysis was
repeated with marital status as one of the control variables.
The SPSS program was limited to five independent variables
[Ref. 11]. Therefore, service branch was deleted in the
analysis to accommodate the variable of marital status.
The results of the analysis, presented in Table XXIV, indi-
cated that marital status did indeed account for some of
the variance in reported compensation levels between age
cohorts. The level of significance dropped from the ,001
level to the .150 level when the variable of marital status
was included in the MCA adjustment. As expected, the largest
correction to reported compensation levels occurred in older
age cohorts. Differences from the sample mean dropped from
$23 to $5 for the 22-24 age cohort and from $51 to $19 for




TOTAL MONTHLY MILITARY COMPENSATION
ADJUSTED FOR MARITAL STATUS
(annual pay in dollars)
Sample Mean = 76 7
































It does appear that in the aggregate, as age increases,
the level of compensation increases. The analysis indicated
that this pattern is produced mainly from the factor of
marital status rather than from the disbursement of special
pays and bonuses for tasks involving hazardous duty or crit-
ical skills. It does appear that increased marital rates
among older individuals coupled with service policy that
allots extra payments to married individuals has acted,
perhaps inadvertendly , as a method of maintaining a better
level of pay comparability with the civilian sector based
on expected aggregate earnings stratified by age.
This supposition is supported by Table XXV, a breakdown
of perceived monthly compensation into the subcomponents of
Basic Pay, BAS , BAQ and special pay.
The analysis indicated, that on average, the oldest age
cohort reported a monthly BAQ level approximately forty
dollars higher than the youngest cohort. Of note, the old-
est entry age cohort reported a monthly level of special
pay that was approximately fifty dollars below that of the
youngest cohort, which indicates the older age entrant may
not be employed at the same level of tasks involving hazard-
ous duty or critical skills as the younger age entrants.
The four control variables all displayed patterns of
variance in reported compensation levels. Caution must be
exercised in interpreting these results. Differences in
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and service branch were not adjusted for marital rates or
for interactions between the control variables. Control
variable variance may exhibit the same pattern of attenua-
tion as displayed by the entry age cohorts if the control
variables were adjusted for their own interactions and dif-
ferent marital rates. Further analysis would be required
to confirm this conjecture.
Another form of compensation is military contributions
to civilian education in the form of the Volunteer Educa-
tional Allotment Program (VEAP) . VEAP is a program in which
a service member may enroll at any time while on active
duty [Ref. 18]. Service personnel may contribute by allot-
ment $25 to $100 per month to a maximum of $2,700. The
Veteran's Administration contributes two for one for a
maximum educational fund of $81,000 which is paid back at a
maximum of S225 a month for 56 months after the individual
leaves the service if the individual attends the same educa-
tion programs as approved by the G.I. bill. This program
could be considered as an investment that is an indicator
of future intent to gain education upon leaving the service.
The result of this analysis is presented in Table XXVI.
The oldest entry age cohort reported contributions to
civilian education at almost twice the level of the youngest
entry age cohort, indicating that of individuals who intended
to leave the service upon completion of their enlistment




MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO CIVILIAN EDUCATION
Sample Mean = 130 (dollars)


























to further their education upon leaving the service. Of
the control variables, only service branch indicated a
significant confidence level. Individual service policy as
well as individual preference may account for this pattern
of variance.
Service occupation and duty station location determine
the off-duty time and options of employment in the private
sector while also serving on active duty. While not a direct
form of compensation, sailors and marines on deployment
clearly have no options of off-duty employment and such a
situation could be viewed as an opportunity loss when a ro-
tation is made from shore to sea duty. Personnel in the
Army and Air Force may also face this opportunity loss when
transferring from installations in urban areas to locations
in foreign or remote locations. Therefore, employment in a
civilian job while also on active duty is predicated on the
ability to work while off-duty as well as the desire or need
for additional monetary compensation. An analysis of reported
annual income earned working in a civilian job while also
on active duty is presented in Table XXVII.
The .955 level of confidence calculated for the entry
age cohorts indicates that a high degree of confidence can
be placed in accepting the null hypothesis that there is no
difference in this case between the entry age cohorts. How-
ever, the difference in response of the control variables
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that in 1979, if working in the civilian environment, active
duty males may have earned more in civilian jobs than active
duty females. Also, individuals with career tendencies may
have earned more on average than those on the first enlist-
ment. Soldiers and marines on average, reported higher
civilian earnings than airmen and sailors. The Oriental
cohort reported civilian earnings that averaged over twice
the level of the sample mean. The Oriental cohort sample
size numbered only 28 individuals. However, the significance
level of .005 indicates that Orientals, on average, may have
a much larger desire or ability to work in the civilian
environment as compared with the other racial cohorts exam-
ined. Further study of the control variables would be required
to verify and explain the patterns of behavior exhibited in
this analysis.
E. PERCEPTIONS OF CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT
As reported by Cooper [Ref. 19], civilian unemployment
is a factor in the determination of enlisted supply. The
existence of differences in the perception of the civilian
labor market caused by entry age would further complicate
the computation of future enlisted supply based on models
involving projected civilian unemployment rates. Perhaps
of greater importance, identification of marked differences
in behavior response to civilian unemployment conditions
of age cohorts would be of value in the determination of
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manpower policy under different force age structures. The
behavior of military personnel in response to the civilian
labor market was examined from three different, although
probably inter-related aspects. Sensitivity to the civilian
labor market was measured by the analysis of survey responses
on the expectations of finding a good civilian job, expected
civilian earnings if the individual was able to leave the
service at the time of the survey and civilian job offers
in the last twelve months prior to the survey.
The analysis of the perception of finding a good civil-
ian job if the respondent left the service, presented in
Table XXVIII, was recorded in same manner mentioned previous-
ly to convert a one to ten scale to a ratio of positive to
total response.
The overall sample mean of 92 percent indicated a very
high percentage of respondents felt they had a high proba-
bility of finding good civilian employmeni. The significance
level of .529 for the entrv age cohorts indicated that there
is probably no difference in the perception of civilian job
opportunity based on entry age stratification.
Significant variance was found in the control variables.
On average, first term individuals indicated slightly higher
rates of positive employment attitudes over those individuals
serving beyond an initial service obligation. This may
indicate a tendency to remain in the service due to the
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difference in response between the gender and race cohorts
may be a reflection of a perception of discrimination in
regards to civilian employment. Females and Blacks indicated
a significantly lower perception of civilian employment
opportunity than the male, Oriental and White cohorts.
While the previous analysis was based on the perception
of what constitutes a "good" job, the analysis of expected
annual earnings if working in the civilian environm.ent quan-
tified the perceived quality of expected civilian employment
by fixing an actual dollar value to what constituted "good"
employment in 1979. The results of the analysis are present-
ed in Table XXIX.
Entry age was significant at the .015 level with expected
annual earnings decreasing for the entry age cohorts of
20-24, and then rising to 14,200 dollars for the oldest entry
age cohort. The average earnings expectation for the oldest
entry age cohort was approximately the same level of expected
civilian earnings as the youngest entry age cohort.
This dip in expected earnings indicated by the middle
age cohorts may be due to several factors. The 17-19 entry
age cohort may have grossly over estimated expected civilian
earnings. This may be a plausible assumption since these
individuals have had little or no actual experience in the
civilian job market. Annual wages for 1978, compiled from
data in the Statistical Abstract of the United States [Ref.
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1978: males 16-24 averaged 9620 dollars, males 25 and
older averaged 15,288 dollars and the median income for all
workers was 11,804 dollars. All entry age cohorts reported
expected earnings well above the national average.
The three younger age cohorts grossly over-estimated
expected civilian earnings in relation to the civilian
sector, although this over-estimation decreased with older
entry age. This may indicate that respondents had an in-
flated civilian estimate due to limited experience in the
civilian labor market, or perhaps was due to the survey
response not resulting in tangible monetary reward or pun-
ishment. If this was the actual level of earning these
cohorts would expect to earn in the civilian sector, the
military must be offering something besides economic incen-
tive to retain younger aged individuals.
The oldest entry age cohort appeared to have a more
realistic approximation of expected earnings in the civilian
sector for individuals in their age cohort. Older age
entrants probably spent several years in the civilian labor
force before enlisting in the service and therefore may have
a more realistic perception of expected civilian earnings.
The supposition was made that the two previous studies
of civilian employment opportunities may have been affected
by actual recruitment attempts by civilian organizations in
the year previous to the survey. The results of this analy-




JOB OFFERS IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS
Sample Mean = 47"5 received job offers


























While entry age was significant at only the .148 level,
the pattern of variance was on the same order as that exhib-
ited in the previous analysis of expected civilian earnings.
Both the youngest and oldest entry age cohorts reported the
same percentage of job offers. Positive response declined
through the two middle cohorts. The lowest and highest entry
age cohorts may perceive themselves as having the ability
to obtain higher paying employment or they may have had a
more accurate estimate of the civilian labor market based
on greater interaction with civilian labor recruiters. If
the lowest and highest entry age cohorts did have an accurate
knowledge of the civilian labor market, the expected earn-
ings that was well over the national average for all entry
age cohorts may indicate that these individuals were being
recruited for civilian occupations that paid well above the
national average.
The disparity of indicated job offers previous to the
survey between cohorts of gender and race variables may be
indicative of differences in levels of job opportunities for
different segments of civilian society. Males reported
significantly greater civilian recruitment attempts than
females, and Whites reported significantly greater levels of
civilian recruitment attempts than Blacks or Orientals.
F. PERCEPTION OF MILITARY LIFE
One measure of military effectiveness that is often
mentioned as an indicator of the potential ability in combat
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is "unit morale." Morale is a concept that is difficult to
measure. For the purpose of this study, we defined morale
as a group personality defined by the aggregate perception
of individuals in the unit.
Two areas of individual perception were examined to test
the hypothesis that entry age affects individual perceptions
of the military organization. They are: (i) the perception
of the unit being able to successfully complete an assigned
wartime mission, and (ii) the individual's overall feeling
of satisfaction with military life. These are only two of
many personal perceptions, that in the aggregate possibly
define the personality of a military unit.
As in the earlier analyses, a one-to-seven scale of
response was recoded to provide output as a ratio of positive
to total response. The result of the analysis of perception
of the individual unit's ability to complete an assigned
;\fartime mission is reproduced in Table XXXI.
Entrv age was found significant at the .064 level and
the analysis indicated that as entry age increased, the
perception of the ability of an individual's unit to com-
plete a wartime mission increased. If the assumption is
made that entry age is not a factor in assignment to units,
then individuals have been assigned randomly among effective
as well as ineffective units, eliminating the possibility
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from units that are actually more effective than units to
which younger entry age cohorts are assigned.
Based on this one measure of individual perception, it
may be inferred that increasing the proportion of older
aged entrants of a unit could enhance unit morale based on
the aggregate perception of the unit's level of effectiveness
Of particular interest was the significant differences
in the responses of the service cohorts. The Army cohort
was well below the other three service cohorts in the per-
ception of ability to complete assigned missions.
The analysis of the second measure used in the study,
v/hat is your overall satisfaction with military life, is
presented in Table XXXII.
Entry age was significant at the .001 level and indi-
cated a pattern of increasing satisfaction with military
life with increasing entry age. This indicates, as in the
previous analysis, individual perceptions of the service
may become more positive with older entry age. Unit effec-
tiveness based on the criteria of morale may increase if
the proportion of older aged entrants increases. To the
extent satisfaction with military life can be an important
determinant of re-enlistment, we may expect to observe
higher re-enlistment rates for older age groups.
The control variables were all highly significant and
indicated that women and minorities, on average, indicated
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and Whites. This may indicate a perception among minority
cohorts within the service that DoD policies may be more
equatiable than those policies found in the civilian sector.
Also of note was the relatively low level of satisfaction
of the Navy cohort in relation to the other services. This
may indicate dissatisfaction with the required length of
time away from homeport that is a characteristic of Navy
missions
.
G. PERCEPTIONS OF RACE RELATIONS
Harmonious interaction between different racial groups
is required to maintain an effective military organization.
Service policies designed to insure equal treatment of all
service members must not only insure racial equality but
must also be perceived as being effective in preventing
racial discrimination. The study of this area of individual
perception examined response in two areas: perception of
the overall treatment of Blacks in the service, and per-
ceptions of the Black cohorts' chances for promotion in
relation to the White cohort. Again, as in earlier analyses,
response was recoded to provide output in the form of a
ratio of positive to total response.
Analysis of the responses to the question, "in my ser-
vice. Blacks are treated exactly the same or a lot better
than Whites", is presented in Table XXXIII.
Entry age was significant at only the .396 level, indi-
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percsption of race relations in the services. However,
significant difference was indicated in the control varia-
ble of race. While 96 percent of the Whites and 85 percent
of the Oriental cohorts indicated the perception of equal
or better treatment of Blacks in relation to Whites in the
service, only 43 percent of the Blacks felt they were treated
equally or better in comparison to Whites. This indicates
that equal opportunity programs are not acting on modifying
the perceptions of the Black cohort even though the other
two racial cohorts overwhelmingly indicated a perception of
equal or even better treatment of Blacks in comparison to
Whites. While this difference in racial perception clearly
deserves further analysis, it was beyond the scope of this
study.
The second area of perception of racial policy examined,
the feeling of promotion chances being affected by race,
presented in Table XXXIV, reproduced the same pattern of
response as the previous question. Again, entry age was
not a significant factor in individual perception.
However, the control variable of race indicated a per-
ception, that in the aggregate, Blacks felt they did not
have equal promotion opportunities in comparison to Whites.
The control variable of Service was significant at the
.001 level for both analyses. However, since the control
variables are not adjusted for interactions with the other
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the four services may explain a large portion of the vari-
ance between the response of the service cohorts.
H. MILITARY RETIREMENT
The hypothesis that entry age would affect behavior
response to changes in the present military retirement sys-
tem was studied by the analysis of positive interest in the
following proposed retirement scenario: people who remained
in the military for ten or more years would receive the
following two benefits of a special lump sum bonus at the
time they leave the service which would be taxed and retire-
ment pay as presented in the schedule in question 84 of
Appendix C. The results of this analysis is presented in
Table XXXV.
Again, one should be cautioned that in view of the in-
flated levels of reported expected civilian income previously
indicated, response to this scenario should not be considered
the probable level of actual behavior if this retirement
system was implemented. However, the variance from the
sample mean of the entry age cohorts indicates that entry
age may effect response to proposed retirement programs.
Entry age was significant at the .047 level and the oldest
aged recruits, on average, were more interested in the
proposed scenario than the youngest cohort. This may indi-
cate that older aged recruits would be more responsive to
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Significant differences also existed in response to the
scenario in the enlistment contract variable. Those with
career intentions were significantly less responsive to the
proposed scenario than those on their first enlistment
contract. This may indicate a need to implement any changes
in current retirement policy with a "grandfather" clause
to minimize possible adverse impact of a revised retirement
program on the career force.
I. PERCEPTION OF PROMOTION
Two separate analyses were used to describe the percep-
tion of promotion based on response to the Rand survey. The
question, "What is your chance of promotion to the next
highest paygrade?", was used to evaluate the perception of
promotion over a shorter time period than total length of
intended service. The second question used in this portion
of the analysis, "What are your chances of promotion in
relation to your peers?", was used to evaluate individual
perception of success that has evolved from an individual's
routine self analysis based on the comparison of perceived
success in relation to co-workers.
The question of what do you think your chances of being
promoted to the next highest paygrade, allowed responses on
a one-to-ten scale ranging from no chance (0 in 10), to
certain (10 in 10), Responses that indicated the individual
didn't know his chances for promotion, planned to retire.
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leave the service or did not expect any more promotions were
omitted from the analysis. Perceived promotion probabilities
of 3 in 10, (some possibility) through 10 in 10 (certain),
were recoded as 1, indicating positive perceptions of promo-
tion. Those with responses of in 10 (no chance) through
2 in 10 (slight possibility) were recoded as zero, indicating
no chance for promotion. This recoding was done so results
of the analysis would be reported as positive perception of
promotion as a ratio of total response. The results of this
analysis are presented in Table XXXVI.
The overall sample indicated that 84 percent felt they
had a positive chance of promotion to the next paygrade.
Variance in response of the age cohorts was significant at
the .171 level. While not as significant as the variance
from the sample mean reported in the control variables, the
entry age cohorts exhibited a pattern of the two middle
entry age cohorts having a slightly higher perception of
positive promotion chances over the youngest and oldest
entry age cohort, which had an equal and slightly lower per-
centage of positive perception. The variance in response
between the age cohorts was too small to inable anv signifi-
cant interpretation.
The control variables did exhibit significant variance
from the sample mean. The variable of service indicated
that those in the Air Force and Navy averaged a higher rate
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Corps cohorts. These patterns indicated that service dif-
ferences existed an individual perception of promotion
chances. Further analysis would be necessary to determine
if these differences were caused by individual service poli-
cy, socialization within the individual services, or perhaps
due to personality types that are initially attracted to
each service during the recruitment decision. A combination
of these factors may also act on perception.
The variance in response between the racial cohorts may
indicate that Whites have slightly higher positive percep-
tions of promotion chances than Blacks and Blacks have
slightly higher perceptions of promotion chances than Orientals
This is also the same pattern of variance exhibited by the
racial cohorts in response to the previous question of the
final paygrade an individual expected to achieve. The
relatively short time interval to the next promotion oppor-
tunity should provide a more accurate representation vis-a-vis
the time interval encompassing the entire length of an
individual's career. Since intended length of service is
a factor in the final paygrade achieved in the military's
hierarchical structure, this question also eliminates the
need to consider intended length of service as a factor in
promotion perception.
The analysis of promotion chances relative to peers
with the same length of service is presented in Table XXXVII.
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had a higher perception of chances of promotion in relation
to co-workers with the same length of service. Entry age
was significant at the .102 level. So while the results
were not statistically conclusive, it appears that older
age entrants may see themselves as more competitive for
promotion than their younger entry age co-workers.
Of the control variables, gender and service branch were
significant at the .001 level. On average, females had a
higher self perception of their abilities in terms of promo-
tion chances than males. The Air Force service members, in
the aggregate, had a higher perception of promotion chances
in comparison to co-workers than the other three services.
In summary, questions regarding promotion used three
different indicators to evaluate promotion perceptions.
While the results were not always statistically conclusive,
the same pattern of increased perceptions of promotion
chances as entry age increased was found in two of the anal-
yses. If this pattern does exist, the self -percept ions of
older aged recruits in feeling they are more promotable in
relation to younger aged recruits could indicate a higher
level of morale among older aged recruits compared to their
younger co-workers.
J. RE -ENLISTMENT INTENT
In the analysis of Rand survey questions concerning
re-enlistment intent it was assumed that economic pressures,
97

in the form of the military to civilian pay-ratio and civil-
ian unemployment, are the major factors in an individuals'
decision to remain in the service past an initial term of
enlistment [Ref. 17]. The responses to the survey questions
in this area were made without any economic sacrifice or
reward on the part of the respondents and the time lag between
the intent expressed in the survey and the chance for acting
on intent could be considerable. Also, the survey questions
were coded for a response based on a scale of one to ten
which ranged from responses of "no chance for re-enlistment"
to "very positive". Responses on the one to ten scale were
grouped into either positive or zero intentions for
re-enlistment. This receding formatted the program output
of positive re-enlistment intentions as a percentage of
total response. For these reasons it should not be implied
that analysis of the Rand data would result in the ability
to compute accurate pay elasticites. However, the analysis
did result in significant variation among the entry age
cohorts. This was expected since aggregate civilian earn-
ings are affected by age [Ref. 17], response to military pay
should behave in the same manner in a volunteer military
environment which is in competition with the civilian sector
for available labor.
The response of first term individuals to three separate
re-enlistment scenarios is presented in Table XXXVIII. The
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intentions for re-enlistment increased with larger bonuses
for the variable of entry age. For each scenario, as entry
age increased, positive intentions increased. Levels of
significance for entry age were .217, .044 and .085 for the
no bonus, $4000 and $8000 scenario respectively. Therefore,
the pattern of increasing re-enlistment intent with older
entry is not conclusive for the no bonus scenario. However,
as bonuses were entered into the scenario entry age became
significant. The oldest recruits indicated higher rates
of positive intent than the younger aged recruits. The
minor variance between the entry age cohorts under tlie no
bonus scenario may indicate that a percentage of the force
will remain without the attraction of a re -enlistment bonus.
The high percentages of females and minorities in comparison
with males and Whites who indicated they would remain in
the service in a zero bonus environment may indicate a per-
ception on the part of these military personnel that the
military offers a better career opportunity for females and
minorities than found in the civilian work force.
The response of career force individuals
,
presented in
Table XXXIX, indicated higher levels of positive intent for
all entry ages in all scenarios over first-term response.
The F-test level of significance for entry age was .187,
.085 and .140 for the no bonus, $4000 and $8000 scenarios
respectively. The same general pattern of behavior for
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[Re£. 20], who state that in general, propensity to leave
decreases v/ith age and length of service.
Of note was the change in career response in the variable
gender. Positive response was the same for both males and
females. This may indicate that those who remain in the
service beyond an initial enlistment have the same attitudes
in this case regardless of sex.
While the question of receiving a re -enlistment bonus
occurs once per enlistment contract, a service members'
economic and social status is re-enforced daily by the pay-
grade a service member holds. Promotion to a higher paygrade
represents increased economic compensation even through years
of DoD pay caps. Perhaps of greater importance, promotion
represents success and increased responsibility that is
prominently displayed on the sleeve of the uniform. The
first term response to the Rand survey question of re-
enlistment in a reduced promotion environment, reproduced in
Table XL, indicated entry age not to be a significant
factor in this case. The response varies by only two per-
cent for the entry age cohorts. However, the control vari-
ables were all significant at the .001 level. Females and
minorities indicated high levels of positive intent in
comparison to males and Whites which, as in the previous
analysis of various re -enlistment bonus scenarios, may
illustrate the perception of these personnel that the mili-
tary offers a better career opportunity for females and
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The analysis of career response to a reduced promotion
environment, presented in Table XLI , indicaied that entry
age is sienificant at the .032 level with the oldest entrants
having much higher levels of positive intent than the young-
est cohort.
Individuals with career intent on average were less
sensitive to reduced promotion chances than those individuals
on their first enlistment. The twenty year retirement plan
may make career individuals less willing to sacrifice years
in service solely on the basis of a reduced chance of promo-
tion. In addition, the oldest age entrants may perceive
themselves to be at an age where a career change may be
difficult and are therefore more committed to a twenty year
career than the younger aged recruits. The variable of
service indicated promotion to be an element of service life
that career sailors hold as more important than their uni-
formed DoD counterparts. The variable of race in this question
indicated that while Orientals appeared less sensitive to
reduced promotion rates than other racial cohorts, Black and
White racial cohorts appear to have the same attitudes
toward this military policy.
K. YEARS OF SERVICE INTENDED
Significant differences in intended years of service
between different entry age cohorts would alter current
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policy alter the present age distribution of recruits.
Separate effects of age and length of service in manpower
systems have been demonstrated by Young [Ref. 21]. Rand
survey data concerning intended total length of service was
analyzed to identify such effects in the military. Differ-
ences in first term and career effects were isolated by
conducting two separate analyses. The results of the first
term analysis are presented in Table XLII . The survey re-
sponse should be viewed within the previously mentioned
constraints by Aizen and Fishbein.
Since no actual result will be realized by the respon-
dent's action and the question involves behavior intent far
in the future, the sample mean of 5.70 years should not be
interpreted as an accurate estimate of actual behavior.
However, trends in variance from the sample mean would pro-
vide an indicator of the difference in intent of the entry
age cohorts
.
Entry age was not found to be significant for first term
individuals. Of the control variables, service branch was
found to be significant. Service branch indicated that, on
average, individuals in the Air Force intended approximately
two more years of service than individuals in the other three
services. An investigation of individual service enlistment
policies would be required to determine if a difference in
the average length of enlistment contracts, rather than an
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factor in the variance between the Air Force and the other
three services.
Analysis o£ career intended years of service, presented
in Table XLIII, indicated entry age to be significant at
the .016 level. The oldest entrants indicated significantly
higher levels of intended service than the younger entry
cohorts
.
The enlistment contract the respondent was serving indi-
cated that the second or greater enlistment indicated total
years of intended service to be over twice that of individ-
uals on the first enlistment. In addition, the oldest entry
cohort of career individuals indicated intended years of
serx^ice that were significantly greater than the younger
cohorts .
Intended length of service appears to be affected by
entrv age and length of service. Based on this analvsis and
reports of the effect of age on other manpower systems,
changes in service policy which would result in larger per-
centages of older aged entrants mav increase retention
rates of uniformed DoD personnel.
Related to length of expected service is the final pay-
grade an individual expects to achieve while in the service.
The survey question, "When you finally leave the military,
what paygrade do you think you will have?", was used to
evaluate aggregate perception of long term achievement within
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service constraints. The question had thirteen possible
responses from paygrade E-1 through W-4 with the warrant
grades of IVl through W4 coded 10 through 15 respectively.
The results of the analysis are presented in Table XLIV for
first term respondents and in Table XLV for "career"
respondents
.
The sample mean of paygrade 4.89, for first term respon-
dents, which equates to an average between E4 and E5 and a
sample mean of 6.40, for career respondents are plausible
estimates of expected final paygrades based on a heuristic
analysis using the average intended length of service of
7.21 years reported for first term individuals in an earlier
analysis and the knowledge that "career" for the purpose of
the study meant only remaining in service beyond one enlist-
ment contract. Entry age was significant at the .001 level,
indicating entry age to be a significant factor in future
behavior intent as to the final paygrade an individual expects
to achieve. As entry age increased, the level of final ex-
pected paygrade increased.
The control variable of sex was found to be highly
significant for first term respondents. Males expected a
higher final paygrade than females. This result may indicate
that females in the service may, on average, have lower
self perceptions of career success in the military than their
male counterparts in the first enlistment contract. For
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expected paygrade of individuals based on sex were not sig-
nificant. This may indicate that those females who remain
in the service beyond an initial enlistment contract may
feel they are equal to males in terms of promotability
.
Differences in the final intended paygrade between the Air
Force, Navy, Army and Marines, for both first term and
career individuals, may be indicative of individual service
policies which affect the perception of final paygrade attain-
ment- The higher overall final paygrade expectations of
career over first term individuals indicates that intended
length of service is also a contributing factor in an indi-
vidual's perception of the highest intended paygrade achieved
while in the service. This would be expected due to length







This study examined two data bases of non-prior service
personnel; historical information on Naval personnel supplied
by DMDC and branchwide DoD survey data administered by the
Rand Corporation in 1978. The data bases were stratified
by age at entry into four entry age cohorts and difference
in cohort historical and intended behavior were measured
based on indicators of desired attributes at accession,
behavior while in the service and intended future behavior
in relation to current or postulated DoD policy. Knowledge
of significant differences in economic and social behavior
based on entry age would be of value in any DoD policy formu-
lation where age of the force is a factor in policy development
Analysis of historical data indicated that in the Navy,
as entry age increased, average AFQT performance increased.
Also, older age entrants appeared to have a greater prefer-
ence than the younger entry age cohorts toward initial ETS
contracts of only tour years. Possibly related to preference
for the length of the initial service contract is the ques-
tion of occupational choice. A high percentage of six-year
ETS contracts are required for ratings that are in the high
technical skill category. As entry age increased, the pro-
portion of the entry age cohort in ratings of the high
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technical skill category decreased. However, the older
entry age cohorts who did enlist for a six-year ETS contract
had a much larger proportion of the cohort in the high tech-
nical skill ratings category than the younger entry age
cohorts
.
Analysis of the FY78 all navy accession cohort indicated
the 22-24 entry age cohort to have the lowest rate of first-
term attrition for both four and six year contracts. While
the oldest entrants had the highest first-term attrition
rate for those individuals who enlisted for a four-year
obligation, the oldest entrants were comparable to the 17-19
entry age cohort in terms of first-term attrition. The major
reasons of failure to fulfill an initial ETS contract were
for medical causes and failure to meet minimum performance
and behavior standards.
Analysis of the 1978 DoD Survey indicated significant
differences existed between the entry age cohorts as to what
service individuals entered, marital status, promotion and
re-enlistment intent, the amount of average montlily military
compensation received, perceptions of civilian employment
and attitudes toward military life. The differences in
response in the majority of survey areas found that the
aggregate response of older age entrants was often more
positive than that of the 17-19 entry age cohort. This
pattern indicated active recruitment of individuals past
the age of twenty may improve the aggregate quality of recruits
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based on several behavioral indicators such as education,
economic knowledge of the civilian environment and attitudes
toward military life.
While not part of the central focus of the analysis,
significant differences were often found in behavior and
behavior intent between the variables of sex, race, first-
term and career enlistments and service branch the respon-
dents were serving at the time of the survey.
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY
Further study of the current utilization of older indi-
viduals is needed to determine if in fact a current propensity
exists for older individuals to access to Navy ratings that
require lower skill requirements. Detailed analysis of
individual training pipelines, controlling for co-variance
of other variables which are co-determinants in the assign-
ment process, would be required to determine if entry age
is a major factor in either the assignment process or the
individual's personal occupational preference.
A more detailed study of first-term attrition stratified
by entry age would be needed to isolate specific causes of
the difference in first-term attrition indicated by the
study of the FY78 all Navy accession cohort. For example, a
high incidence of older individuals being discharged for
physical reasons not tied to occupational requirements could
be corrected through administrative action.
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While the study analyzed trends in economic behavior
based on entry age, further study would be needed to deter-
mine actual pay elasticities based on entry age. Likewise,
while the study found significant differences in intended
behavior in areas of retention, follow-on studies would be
required to determine actual behavior over time to confirm
indicated trends based of behavior intent.
Finally, it should be noted that all individuals in the
samples studied had one thing in common: they all enlisted
in the Armed Forces. Parallel studies of both the civilian
population and prior-service individuals who re-entered the
service would be required to determine if the DoD population
is representative of behavior found in the civilian sector.
While this study utilized data on non-prior service per-
sonnel stratified by age at entry from only the two above
mentioned sources, other sources of data are available.
DMDC maintains the following data files which may be of
interest to individuals conducting further research the area
of entry age; DoD-civilian central personnel data file,
enlisted/officer master file, civilian cohort file, military
reserve file, federal personnel statistical program and the
military inpatient hospital file. In addition, information
on prior- service individuals is contained in the enlisted/
officer separation and re -enlistment file maintained by DMDC
Information on pre-service and post-service individuals can
be found in the AFEE ' s examination and accession file, VA
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education and training benefits file, DoD post-service survey
file, military retiree and transition files. Information on
the civilian population can be found in the census ZIP code
summary file and the current population survey. Other sources
of information can be found in the enlisted survival track-
ing file (STF) which contains both longitudinal and biograph-
ical information and is further explained in [Ref. 22], the
1979 DoD survey of personnel entering military service
administered [Ref. 25] by the Rand Corporation to individuals
upon entering military service. The National Longitudinal
Survey of Labor Force Behavior, Youth Survey (NLS)
,
selected
in 1978 and interviewed in 1979 and 1980, is a nationally
representative sample of approximately 12,000 American youth
aged 15 to 25. The NLS sample was selected and designed to
yield a data base of youth that can be statistically projected
(within known confidence levels) to represent the entire
population born in 1957 through 1964 and substantively impor-
tant subgroups within this population [Ref. 24].
C. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Analysis of AFQT scores and levels of formal educational
attainment indicated that older individuals who accessed to
the services are, on average, a more desirable group than
17-19 year olds. Active recruitment of older individuals




Analysis of first-term attrition of the FY78 Navy acces-
sion cohort indicated the 22-24 entry age cohort to have a
greater propensity to remain in the Navy and complete a term
of service. This indicates first-term retention could be
increased by accessing larger numbers of individuals between
the ages of 22-24.
Finally, the percentage of DoD non-prior accessions over
the age of 21, presented in Table XLVI , indicate that through
out the life of the AVF , the percentage of older entrants has
almost doubled. Differences in perceptions and behavior in-
tent based on entry age, implied from this study of the 1978
DoD survey data, should be examined further.
TABLE XLVI
DoD NON-PRIOR SERVICE ACCESSIONS OVER AGE 21












Conformation and quantification of personality and behavior
intent differences based on entry age will be essential to
the task of policy formulation as larger percentages of the
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force come from accession cohorts other than the traditional




TECHNICAL SKILL RENOIR EMENTS FOE 0. S. NAVY RATINGS
Semi-Technical
Technical
ABE ABF ABH AK 3H BT* FT* LI
MS PC PN R? SH SK SM YN
AD AG AME A MH AMS AO ASE ASH
ASM AW AZ BU CE CM CTA CTO
CTR DK B« DP DT SA EM* EN
20 GMG GMM GMT GSE* GSfl* HM IC
IM IS JO ML MM* MN MR MU
CM OS or PH PM PR 2M HM*
SW TK UT
Highly Technical
AC AS AQ* AT* AX* CTI* CTM* CTT*
DS* ST* EW* PTB FTG* FT:!* MT* STG*
TD
Source: [R^f. 25].





Release from Active Service
Expiration of term of Service 1
Early Release - Insafficient Ret ainability 02
Early Release - To Attend School 03
Early Release - Police Duty 04
Early Release - In the National Interest 05
Early Release - Seasonal Employment 06
Early Release - To Teach 07
Early Release - Other (Including HI?) 08
Med ical Disqualification
Conditions Existing Prior to Service 10
Disability- Serverance Pay 11
Permanent Disability- Retired 12
Temporary Disability- Retired 13
Disability- Non EPTS- No Severance Pay 1U
Disability- Title 10 Retirement 15
Unqualified for Active Duty- Other 16
Dependen cy of Hardship
Dependency 20
Hardship 21
Dependency or Hardship 22
Battle Casualty 30
Non-Battle- Disease 31
Non- Bat tie- Other 32
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Death- Causa Not Specified 33
Ent ry into Officer Prqgranis
Officer Commissioning Program UO
Warrant Officer Program 4 1
Service Academy 4 2
Retirement (Other than ^edj.cal)
20-30 Years of Service 50
Over 30 Years of Service 51
Other 52
Failure to Meet Minimum Behavioral or Performance Criteria
character or Behavior Disorder bO
Motivational Problems 6 1
Enuresis 6 2
I na pt itude 6 3
Alcoholism 6 4
Discreditable Incidents- Civilian or Military 65
Shirking 6 6
Drugs 6 7
Financial Irresponsibilit y 6 8
Lack of Dependent Support 69
[Insanitary Habits 7





AWOLr Desertion 7 5
Homosexuality 7 6
Sexual Perversion "'7
Good of the Service "^3






Unfitness (Reason Unknown) 81
Onsuitability (Season Unknown) 82
Basic Training Attrition 84
Failure to Meet Mininsum Qualifications for Retention 85
E xped iti o us D ischar ge 86
Trainee Discharge 87
Secretarial Authority 9
Erroneous Enlistment or Induction 9 1




Conscientious Ob j ector 9 6
Parenthood 97
Breach of Contract 98
Other 9 9




POD 1978 ENIiISTFD 2IIISTI0NN AIRE FORM ONE
I. Military Background
1. Record time began, enter military hour:
Time Began
2. In what aonth are you completing this survey?
January 197 9 01
February 19 79 02
March 1979 03
April 19 79 04
May 1979 05
June 1979 06





4. What is your present pay grade?
El E2 S3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 S9




























































Mi ss is si pp i 2 5 M is s o a ri 2 6
F0REI3N COUNTRIES
Africa 52 Belgian 5 3
Caribbean 54 Diego Garcia 5 5
East Asia 56 Eastern Europe 57
Germany 58 Greece 5 9
Guam 60 Iceland 6 1
Iran 62 Italy 6 3
Japan or OKinawa 64 Near Ea-^t 65
Netherlands 66 Panama Canal Zona 67
Philippines 68 Portugal 6 9
South Korea 70 Spain 71
Turkey 72 Unitei Kingdom 73
Other overseas location
net listed above 74
7. How do you feel about your current location? Please marlc
the number which shows your opinion on the line below. For
example, people who are 7erx Satisfied with their current
location would mark 7. People who are Very Pl.ssa-cisf ied
with their current location would mark 1, Other people may





1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. To the nearest year and monrh, how long have you been on
active duty? (if you had a break in service, count time and





9. In which enlistment period ar= you serving? If you
received an EXTENSION -to your current enlistment period, do
not coun't this as a new enlistment pariod.
1st 2ed 3rd Uth 5th or more
* IF THIS IS YOOR FIRST ENLISTMENT, 30 TO Q14 *
10. Which of the following did yoj receive as part of or
since your last reenlistaant contract ?
HARK ALL THAT APPLY
Proficiency Pay 1
Guaranteed Location of Duty Station 1
Guaranteed Length of Assignment 1
Guaranteed Training or Retraining in
a new MOS/Rating/AFSC 1
Guaranteed Job Assignment 1
Improved Promotion Opportunity 1
None of the above 1
11. Which of the following reenlistment bonuses did you
receive at your last enlistment? Ea sure to aark all ^/nat
apply.
I did not receive a reenlis^rmenr. bonus 1
Regular Reenlistment Bonus (RR3) 1
Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SP3) 1
Variable Reenlistment Bonus (VH3) 1






RECEIVE A REENLISTMENT BONDS, GO TO QIU *
12. What is the tctal amount, befor=5 taxes and ether
deductions, that you will receive from raenlistmen" bonuses
ImiliS 12i}ll. cunrent enlistment?
TOTAL REENLISTMENT BONQS $
,
13. How much of this r=enlistment bonus payment did you
receive during liZS?
None 00000
Amount received in 19 78 $
,___
14. Hew soon will you complete your current enlistment
INCLUDING ANY EXTENSIONS YDU HAVE N0»?
Less than 3 months 1
At least 3 months but less than 6 months 2
At least 6 months but less than 9 months 3
At least 9 monrhs but less than 12 months 4
At least 1 year but less than two years 5
At least 2 years but less than 3 years 6
At least 3 years or more 7
A. RESNLISTMENT/CaSEER INTENT
15. When you finally leave the military, how many total




16. When you finally l9av'9 the military, what pay grade do
think you will have? Mark One.
ENLISTED GRADES: E1 E2 E3 £«* E5 S6 E7 E8 E9
WARRANT GRADES: W1 W2 W3 WU
17. When you finally leave the military, do you plan to join





Don't Know/Not sure 5
18. Suppose there was a new military program that service
personnel could participate in after they leave the mili-
tary. The program requires that yoa must keep the military
informed of your addr=s= and you could be recalled to
service in the event of a national energency. However, you
would not be required to attend drills or serve on active
duty, unless there was an smergency.
If you were given a bonus of $200 for each ^ear you partici-
pated in this program, how many vea-s would you be willing









6 or more 06
19. Wha-^ are the chances that your next tour of duty will bs
in an undesirable location? Hark or.9.
Does not apply, T plan to retire -7
No chance (0 in 10) 00
Very slight possibility (1 in 10 ,_0 1
Slight possibility (2 in 10) 02
Some possibility (3 in 10) 3
Fair possibility (U in 10) OU
Fairly good possibility (5 in 10) 05
Good possibility (6 in 10) 06
Probable (7 in 10) 07
Very probable (8 in 10) 03
Almost sure (9 in 10) 09
Certain (13 in 10) 10
Don*t know where I'll be assigned next_-8
20. HCw likely are you to reenlist a*^ the end of your
current term of service? Assume that no Re^nlis-ment Bonus
Payments will be given, but that all other special pays
which you currently receive are still available, Hark one.
Does not apply, I plan to retire -7
No chance (0 in 10) 00
Very slight possibility (1 in 10 1
Slight possibility (2 in 10) 2
Some possibility {3 in 10) 3
Fair possibility (U in 10) 04
Fairly good possibility (5 in 10) 05
Good possibility (6 in 10) 06
Probable (7 in 10) 07
Very probable (3 in 10) 08
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Almost sure (9 in 10) 09
Certain (10 in 10) 10
Don't knew -3
21- Think for a minute about the differen"^ reenlisttnent
options that are currently availabls to personnel in lour
service. If you decide! to reenlist at the end of your
current term of service, which reenlistment £eriod would you
sign up for? Mark one.
2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 6 yaars
- If you have been on artive duty
11 I3AHS 05 MORE,
Go to 326 -
NOTE: QUESTIONS 22-25 ARE NOT ANSWERED BY ALL RESPONDENTS:
- If the respondent has bean on active duty for 12 YEARS OR
J^ORE
(See Q8) , then the Respondent should NOT answer Q22-Q25.
(Refer to special
instruction above 322),
- If the respondent has baen on active duty for LESS THAN 12
YEARS
(See Q8) , 'ihen Q22-Q25 should be answered.
- I? YOU HAVE BEEN ON ACTIVE DUTY 12 YEARS OF !!ORE, GO TO
Q26 -
PLEASE INDICATE IN THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS HOW LIKELY YOU
WOULD BE TO REENLIST AT THE END OP YOUR CURRENT TERM OF
SERVICE IF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS WERE AVAILABLE.
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22. How likely would you be to reenlist at the end of your
current term of service if you were guara nteed a choice of
location for your next tour? Assune that no Reenlistinent
Bonus Payments will be given but that all other special pays
which you currently receive are still available.
No chance (0 in 10)
Very slight possibility (1 in 10 01
Slight possibili*!y (2 in 10) 02
Some possibility (3 in 10) 03
Fair possibility (4 in 10) OU
Fairly good possibility (5 in 10) 05
Good possibility (6 in 10) 06
Probable (7 in 10) 07
7ery probable (3 in 10) 08
Almost sure (9 in 10) 09
Certain (10 in 10) 10
Don't know -8
23. How likely would you b e to reenlist at the end of your
current term of service if military personnel in your career
field received a S {£,000 bonus?
No chance (0 in 10) 00
Very slight possibility (1 in 10 1
Slight possibility (2 in 10) 02
Some possibility (3 in 10) 3
Fair possibility (U in 10) 04
Fairly good possibility (5 in 10) 5
Good possibility (6 in 10) 06
Probable (7 in 10) 7
Very probable (8 in 10) 08
Almost sure (9 in 10) 9




2U. How likely would you be to rssnlist at ths end of your
current term of service if military personnel in your career
field received a $ 8,000 bonus?
No chance (0 in 10) 00
Very slight possibility (1 in 10 01
Slight possibility (2 in 10) 2
Some possibility (3 in 10) 3
Fair possibility C* in 10) 04
Fairly good possibility (5 in 10) 05
Good possibility (8 in 10) 06
Probable (7 in 10) 07
Very probable (8 in 10) 08
Almost sure (9 in 10) 9
Certain (10 in 10) __10
Don't know -8
25, How likely would you be to reenlist at ths end of your
current term of service if military personnel if a Two Year
Re^nl is-^ ment Period wera available? Assume that no
Reenlistment Bonus Payments will be given, but that all
other special pays which you currently receive are still
available.
No chance (0 in 10) 00
Very slight possibility (1 in 10 1
Slight possibility (2 in 10) 2
Some possibility (3 in 10) 3
Fair possibility {'4 in 10) 04
Fairly good possibility (5 in 10) 05
Good possibility (6 in 10) 06
Probable (7 in 10) 07
Very probable (8 in 10) 8
Alaos- sure (9 in 10) 09



















27. What do you think your chances are of being promoted to
the next higher pay grade? Mark one-
Does not apply, I plan -o retire -3
Does not apply, I plan to leave th? service -3
Does not apply, I do not expect any more promotions -3
No chance (0 in 10) 00
Very slight possibility (1 in 10 01
Slight possibility (2 in 10) 02
Some possibility (3 in 10) 03
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Fair possibility («J in 10) OU
Fairly good possibility (5 in 10) 05
Good possibility (6 in 10) 06
Probable (7 in 10) 07
Very probable (8 in 10) 08
Almost sure (9 in 10) 09
Certain (10 in 10) 10
Don*t know -9
28. Think for a minuts about other military personnel v*ho
have the same total years of service that you have. Which of
the following statements best describes when you expect your
next promotion?
Does not apply, I plan to retire 10
Does not apply, I plan to leave the Service_09
Does not apply, I lo not expect any
more promotions 08
EARILSR than most people who have the same
total years of service 1
AT ABOOT THE SAME time as most people who
have the same total years of service 2
LATER than most people who have "he same
-ctal years of service
,
3
29. How soon do you expect your next promotion? Mark one.
Does not apply, I plan to retire 10
Does not apply, I plan to leave the
ser vice 9
Does not apply, I do not expect any
mere promotion s 8
Less than 1 year 1
At least 1 year but less than 2 years 02
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At least 2 years bat less than 3 years 3
At least 3 years but less than 4 years OU
At least U years but less than 5 years 05
At least 5 years bat less than 6 years 06
6 or more years 7
Don't know 03
30. Suppose you knew that your chances of being promoted to
the next higher pay grade were reduced by 5Q% because of
reduced manpower requirements. How likely would you be to
reenlist at the end of your current term of service if your
knew that your promotion op port unity was reduced?
Does not apply, I plan to retire -7
No chance (0 in 10) 00
Very slight possibility (1 in 10 1
Slight possibility (2 in 10) 02
Some possibility (3 in 10) 03
Fair possibility (4 in 10) 04
Fairly good possibility (5 in 10) 5
Good possibility (6 in 10) 06
Probable (7 in 10) 07
Very probable (8 in 10) 08
Almost sure (9 in 10) 09
Certain (13 in 10) 10
Don't know -3
31. Below are some reasons military personnel may have for
leaving the Armed Forces. If you hav= considered leaving -he
service at the end of your current term, please mark the
three most iioortant reasons why you would leave the
service.





















the service (Go to Q. 32) 1
Does not apply, I plan to rstire at tha end of
my current term (So to 32)
Not eligible to rsenlist
Dislike location of my assignments
Frequency of PCS loves
Dislike being separatsd from ray family
My family wants ma to leave the servica
Disagree with personnel policies
Discrimination against military personnel based
on sex, race, or rank
Not enough opportunity for advancement
Low pay and allowances
Better civilian job opportunities
Reduction in military benefits
Decline in quality of military personnel
Onable to practice my job skills
Bored with my job
Don't like my job
Plan to continue my education/use G.I. /VEA?
benefits 1
HILITARY WORK SXPERI3NC2
32. Follow the instructions below for your service:
ARMY: Record your current Primary MDS and the first Primary
Mos that you received when you entered active duty. Use -^he
first four entries of your MOS. For example, MOS 11320
would be marked as 11 B2.
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NAVY: Record your curraat Primary Rating and -^he first
Primary Eating that you received when you entered active
duty. Use all four entries of your Rating, For example,
GMM3 would be marked as GMM3. Bi^SN would be marked as 3MSN.
MARINE CORPS: Record your current Primary MOS and the first
Primary Kos that you received when you entered active duty.
Use the four numbers of your HOS. For example, KOS 0311
would be marked as 03 11.
AIR FORCE: Record your current Primary MOS and the first
Primary Mos that you received when you entered active duty.
Ose the first four numbers of your AFSC— DO NOT USE
LETTERS. For example, AFSC AU3130C would be marked as a313.
INSTRUCTIONS: Write ONE number or letter in each box. Then,
mark the matching circle below each box.
A. MY CURRENT PRIMARY MOS/R ATING/AFSC IS:
First Second Third Fourth
Letter/Number Letter/Number Letter/Number Letter/Number
I don*t know my Current Primary M0S/RATIN3/AFSC
B. MY FIRST PRIMARY MOS/RAT ING/AFSC AT ENTRY WAS:
First Second Third Four-h
Letter/Number Letter/Fumber Lett=r/Number Letter/Number
I don 't know my
First
Primary MOS/RATING/AFSC
33, Which of the following best describes the kind of work




Most of my time is spent SUPERVISING people 1
Most of my time is spent PERFORMING my work skills 2
34. LAST MONTH, how mach of the time did yoii work in jobs
outside your current Primary MOS/RATING/AFSC?
Most of the time 1
About half of the tims 2
Some of the time 3
Very littla of the time 4
None of the time 5
Now a few questions about your work schedule during the
last seven days. Record your answers in Chart ^o. 1 below.
During the last 7 days, how many hours did you spend . . .
35 . . - working during r egul ar da7time hours -- that is
,
6:00 a.m. to 6:00 H-m., Mpg day throuili ZlL^^I'^
36 . . . working during hours OTHER THAN regular daytime
hours? Please count hours worked luring the EVENINGS, AT
MlSir 01 ISM'^ni hl2 2IHER HOORS NOX INCLUDING 6:00 a.m.
to 6:00 2-21-r -122.1^1 •^hrough Eridai.
37, Please add the number of hours listed in Q35 and Q36 and
enter in boxes below for 33 7.
CHART ^0. 1
35. HOURS WORKED DURING REGULAR DAYTIME HOURS A.
3 6. HOURS WORKED OTHER THAN REGULAR DAYTIME HOURS B.
3 7. TOTAL HOURS WORKED LAST WEEK C.
A + 3 = C
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38. Please check: is the namb^er you 9n^'ered in Q37 the TOTAL
NUMBER OF HOUHS THAT YOQ SOAKED DURING THE LAST WEEK? IF NOT
PLEASE CORRECT THE ANSWERS IN THE PRECEDING BOXES FOR Q35,
36, AND 37.
Q. 38 WAS NOT PROCESSED
39. In the last seven daysr how many hours wer5 you on call/
on alert status/on a duty roster?
None .
C. INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
40. Are you male or female?
M ale 1
F ema 1 = 2
41. How old were you on your last birthday?
AGS LAST BIRTHDAY
42- When you FIRST ENTERED ACTIVE SERVICE, how old were you?
AGE AT ENTRY







44. Whar do you consider to be yoar main racial or ethnic
group?
Mark one
A fro- A meric an/Black/Negro 1
American Indian/Mask an Native 2
Hispanic/Puerto Hican/Mexican/






45. When you FIRST ENT3KED ACTIVE SERVICE, what was your
marital status?
Ma rr ied 1
Widowed 2
Divorced 3
Sepa rat ei 4
Single, nev^r ritarriad 5
46. What is your marital status NOW/
Married 1
Wi do wed 2
Divorced 3
Separated 4





MARRI3D NOW, GO TO 351.
47. Hew many years have you been aarried to your current
spouse?
-o less than 1 year
# YEARS MARRIED
48. How old was your spouse on his or her last birthday'
U9. Has your SPOUSE ever served on active duty in the mili-
tary service? Mark all that apply.
A. No, my spouse has never served
B. Yes, my spDuse is
CnRRENTLY SEH7ING
E nli st r e 1
Officer 2
C. Yes, ay spouse
2iIiI22SLY SERVED
AS AN:
E nli St e e 3
Officer 4
50. What is the highest grade or y?2r of regular school o^




ELSMEMTARY GRADES: 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th
8th
HIGH SCHOOL GRADES: 9th 10th 11th 12th (include G2D)
COLLEGE-YEARS OP CREDIT: 1234 5678 or more
51. when you FIRST ENTERED ACTIVE SERVICE, what was the
highest grade or year of regular school or college X2ii h--
COMPLETED and GOTTEN CREDIT for? Mark one.
ELEMEMTARY GRADES: 1st 2nd 3rd ath 5th 6th 7th
8 th
HIGH SCHOOL GRADES: 9th 10th 11th 12th (include GED)
COLLEGE-YEARS OF CREDIT: 1 2 3 U 5 6 7 8 or more
52. AS OF TODAY, what is your highest education level? mark
one,
ELSMEMTARY GRADES: 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th ^th
3th
HIGH SCHOOL GRADES: 9th 10th ll^h 12th (include GED)
COLLEGE-YEARS OF CREDIT: 12345678 or more
53. Do you have a GED Csrtificata 3f a High School Diploma
I have a GED C^r-^ificate 1
I have a High School Diploma 2
I do not have a GED certificate




54. How many dependents 5.0 you have? Do not include your-













10 or more 10
* IF NONE, GD TO Q57. *
THE NEXT TWO QUESTIONS ARE ABOUT THE DEPENDENTS YOU COUNTED
IN Q5U.
55. How many of your dapendants are children, including












10 or more 10
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56. How many of your dependents are children, including














10 or more 10
57. How many people, incladiiia your spouse, are living wirh











10 or ni ore 13
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D. CORHENT HOUSING ARRANSBMSNIS
58. In what type of housing do you carrently live? Mark One.
I live in civilian housing 1
I live in the following type of military
quarters:
On board Ship 2
Open 3ay/Trocp 3ar racks 3
Bachelor Enlisted Quarters (3SQ) 4
ON-BASE Military Family Housing 5
OFF-BASS Military Family Housing,
including leased and rental guaranteed
housing 6
59. How do you feel about your current housing? Mark one





1 2 3 4 5 6 7
60. Suppose you had *:o rent civilian housing at your current
location -- How much do you think you would have ro pay PER
MONTH, including ut ilitia s, for civilian housing in this
area? Please give your best estimats.
^_r
** IF YOa LIVE IN MILITARY HOUSING, GO TO QUESTION 54 **
61. Which of the following best desoribes your main reason
for
living in civilian housing? Mark One.
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I am no-^. eligible to live in military housing 1
I'm waiting to be assigned to military housing 2
?!ilitar7 housing was not available 3
I prefer civilian housing 4
I have other r-=>asons 5
62. Is the CIVILIAN HOUSING that you live in now —
Owned or being bought by yoi or someone in
ycur household 1
Rented for cash 2
Occupied without payment of cash ren* 3
* 17 700
OWN YOOR CURRENT RESIDENCE, 3 TO ^64. *
63. LAST MONTH, what did you pay for rent and itilit^es fo:
the civilian housing that you live in now?
5,,




3 or more 3
* I? YOU
DO NOT
OWN ANY H3«ES, GO TO Q69. *
The next few guestions are about the home that you own. I
you own nore than one heme, answer the following question




65. In what y^sar did you gat this hons?
19__
66. What was the purchase pric9 of this home?
$ ,
67. LAST MONTH, what was your monthly mortgage payment for
this home?




E. SILITaRT COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
69. What is th amount of your 2.2.NTHL? b5.sic pa^ before taxes
and other deductions? If you don't icnow the axact amount,
please give your best estimate.
^
70. What is the amount of your lOJiTHLY basis Allowance of
Quarters (3AQ)? BAQ is a cash payment for housing. If you
don^t know the exac* amount, please give your best estimate.
o I do not receive a BAQ =000
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71. What is the amount cf your MONrHLT Basic Allowance for
Subsistence (SAS) ? BAS is a cash payment for food. If you
don't know the exact amount, please give your best estimate.
o I do not receive a BAS =000
S
72. Which of the following special monthly pays or allow-
ances do you currently receive? Be sure to mark all that
apply,








COLA (Overseas Cost of Living Allowance)
Overseas Special Housing Allowance





3ECEI7E ANY SPECIAL MONTHLY PAYS, GO TO Q74, *
73. How much monayk do ycu currently receive eac h month,
before taxes and other deductions, from the special monthly




7^1. On the average, about how much mDney do you, your spous*^
or your dependents spend each S2Islli -^ ^^^ military
exchanges (e.g. PX, BX, Ship Store, stc.)? Please give your
best estinate.
$_,
75. About how much money do you, your spouse or your depen-
dents spend each month in njilitar^. commissaries? Please
give your best estimate.
S_,
76. About how much money do you, your spouse or your depen-
dents spend each month in civilian grocery stores? Please
give your best estimate.
5-r—
77. Suppose you are assigned to a duty station where
Military Medical Services, Military Commi3sari=53 and
Military Exchanges are not available. At -ht duty station
you would be paid three a ddit ional monthly allowances to
make up for the lack of these services.
A- How much of an additisnal monthly allowance do you think
would be fair to make ip for the lack of MILITAEY M2DICAL
SSR VICES at such a location?
Pair Montly
Allowance for Medical Services S
B. How much of an additional iont.hly allowance do you think
would be fair to make up for the lack of MILITARY






C. How much of an additional monthly allowance do you think
woald be fair to make up for the lack of MILITARY EXCHANGES




78. How much money do you currently contribute each month
to the Veteran Education Assistance Program (7EA?)
?
I am not eligible to participate in VEAP
I am eligible but I do no* participate in 72AP 1
$50 per month 2
$55 per mon-^h 3
$60 per month 4
$65 per mcn^h 5
$70 per month 6
$75 per month 7
79. During 1978, how much money did your service contribute
to pay for your educational expenses at at civilian school?
o Qone
t_,
80. AS OF TODAY, how many unused official military leave
days do you have?
o none
» JNUSED LEAVE DAYS
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81. In the past 5 years-- that is frDm 1974 to aow, hew ni;»ny
military leave days did you turn in for a cash payment at
the time ^ou reenlisted?
Does not apply, I never reenlisted -7
None
F. MILITARY HETIREHEHT SYSTEM
82. Currently, all military personnel who retire after 20 or
more years of service are given retirement benefits which
begin immediately upon retirement and continue for life.
People who leave the servics with 20 years of mvice
receive 50% of their basic pay as retirement benefits.
Suppose you retired wi*: h 26 lears of service — under the
current retirement system, what percent of your basic pay
would you receive as retirement pay?
83. Suppose you retired with 20 years of service at an S-7
pay grade and you had to choose the way in which your
retirement benefits would be paid. Which of the following
would you choose? The payments listed below would be th=?
initial payment schedule; however, your futire payments
would be adjusted fo^ in fla tica and taxed in the same way as
the current retirement system.
Mark One
$5,80 a year for a lifetime 1
$6,60 a year for 20 years 2
$9,140 a year for 10 years 3
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$1U,810 a year for 5 years 4
$32,3 50 a year for 2 years 5
A lump sum of 356,150 at the time
of retirement 6
8U. Suppose the Armed Forces had a different retirement plan
in effect at the time you first anterad active service,
under this new plan, people who regain in the military for
10 or more v^ars would receive the following two benfefits:
A special lump sum bonus at the time they leave
the service. This bonus would be
taxe d.
and Retirement pay.
If the benefits shown below had been available at the time
you
f^rst
entered active service, how many total years would you have
planned to serve in the mi lizarv? Enter vqur answer in A.
belo w.
DESCPIPTIDN OF DIFFERENT PETI3EHENT PLAN
YEABS OF SERVICE A.
AHOONT OF LU!«P SUM BONUS
YOD WOULD RECEIVE AT THE TIMS YOU RETIRED 3.
AKOUNT OF BASIC PAY YOU
WOULD RECEIVE AS RETIRE^IENT BENEFITS C.
AGE WHEN RETIREMENT BENEFITS WOULD BEGIN D.
less than
10 $0 0^ none
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1 8, 000 20 . 0% 6 5 y<=ars
old
1 1 10, 000 22- 5% 65
12 12,000 25.0'? 65
13 1U,000 27.5% 65
14 16, 003 30. 0% 65
15 20,000 32. 5r, 62
16 2 4, 000 3 5.0", 62
17 28, 000 37. 5^ 62
18 32, 000 40. 0*^ 62
19 36, 000 42.5^ 62
2 4 0, 000 45. 0"^ 62
21 43,000 48.0'^, 60
2 2 4 6, 000 5 1. O^'o 60
2 3 4 9, 000 54. 0% 60
24 52, 000 57. 0% 60
25 54, 000 60. 0% 60
26 56, 000 63.0% 60
27 58,000 66.0% 60
28 60, 000 69. 0% 60
29 62,003 72.0% 60
30 64,000 75.0% 55
A. UNDER THIS PLAN, I WOULD HAVE PLANNED TO SER7E:
EXPECTED YEARS OF SERVICE
B, If you had served taa number ^f years you entered in
Q84A, What pay grade do you think you would have had when
you left the military? Mark One.
ENLISTED GRADES: E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9
WARRANT GRADES: W1 W2 H3 W4
85. If you had a choice, which military re-iremsnt
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plan would ycu choose?
M^rk One
Military R=5tirament Plan Described in
Question 8U 1
Current Military Retirement Plan 2
G. CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE EXPERIENCE
86. During 1973, how many hoars a wsek did you spend on the
average working at a civilian job ar at your own business
d uring lour o ff-duty hours?
none (Go to Q38)
average: *
hojbs per week
87. Altogether in 1978, what was the total amount, -hat you
earned, before taxes and other deductions, for working
iii^iUS Z21i^ off-duty hours?
* IF YOU ARE NOT MARRIED, GO TD Q91.*
The next few questions are about your spouse's employinent.
88. Last week, was your SPOJSE working full tiaie or part
time, going to school, keeping house, or doing something
else? My spouse was:
Mark all that apply
In the Armed Forces 1
Working full time in civilian job 1
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Self-employed in his or her own
business
With a job, but not at work because of
TEMPORARY illness, vacation , strike, etc
Onemployed, laid off, looking for work
Retired
In School
Keeping house/Responsible for child cars
Other
1
39. In 1973, how many weeks did your SPOUSE work for pay,
either full or part-time, at a civilian job, not counting
work around the house? Include weaks that your spouse was
on paid vacation and paid sick leave.
None (Go to Q91)
# WEEKS
90. Altogether in 1973, rf hat was the total amount, before
taxes and other deductions, that YDQR SPOUSE earned from a
civilian job or his or her own businass?
o ^one
CIVILIAN EARNINGS
OF SPOUSE IN 1978 $
,
H. FAMILY RESOURCES
91. During 1973, did you or your spouse receive any income
from the following sources? MARK 'YES* OR 'NO* FOR EACH
ITEM.






Suppleraentary S'Scurity Incoms? 1 9
Public Welfare or Assistance? 1
3 ov eminent Food Stamps? 1
Onemploy ment Compensation of Workman's
Compensation? 1
Interest and Dividends on Savings, Stocks,
Bonds, or other Investments? 1
Pensions from Federal, State or Lo^al
Sovernment Employment? 1
Pensions from Private Employer or Jnion 1
Mimony, Child Support or other Regular
Contributions from persons not Living
in Your Household? 1
Anything else, not including earnings from wages or sala-
ris s? 1
92- During 1978, how much did you or your spouse r^ceiv^
from the sources listed in Q9 1 ? do not include earnings
from vages or salaries in this question. Just give your
best es-^imate.
o No income fron sources is Q91
$
__,
93, What was vcur familZll I2IiL I^^^fl^f before taxes and
other other deductions, from all mili-^ary and civiliin
sources for all of last year-- 1973? Please include
civilian earnings that you listed in Q87, Q90, and Q92, your
yearly military earnings and any oth^^r income in 1978.




94. As of today, what is your esti!nat<r of ths total amount








$10,00 0-514, 999 6
$15,000 or more 7
95. What would you say is the total value of any savings
accounts, checking accounts or cash, O.S. Savings Bonds,
stocks cr securities that you aay have right now?
Mark One
$0 1
$ 1 -$49 9 2
$5 00-$ 1,9 99 3
$2,0 00-<:4,9 9 9 4
$5 , 00 -$9 , 9 9 9 5
$io,ooo-$i4, g^'g 6
$15,000 or a ore 7
96. Compared to three years ago, is your financial situ-
ation now--
A Lot Better than 3 Years igo 1
Somewhat Better than 3 Years ago 2
About the Same as 3 Years ago 3
Somewhat Worse than 3 Years ago 4
A Lot Worse than 3 Years a?o 5
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I. CIVILIAN JOB SSABCH
97. In the past 12 months, did yoii receive any job offers




98. If you were to leave th« service NOW and try to find a
civiiain job, how likely would y^u be to find a 222!i
civilian job?
No chance (0 in 10) 00
Very slight possibility (1 in 10 1
Slight possibility (2 in 10) 2
Some possibility (3 in 10) 3
Fair possibility (U in 10) CU
Fairly good possibility (5 in 10) 05
Good possibility (6 in 10) 06
Probable (7 in 10) 07
Very probable (8 in 10) 3
Almost sure (9 in 10) 9
Certain (10 in 10) 10
Don't Icnow -8
99. If you laft the service right NOW, how much would you
expect to earn PER Y^AR in wages and salary if you took: a





I don't know what I can earn in civilian life. ... -3
IbO

100. Suppose ycu were to leave the service NOW and try to
find a civilian job. How likely would you be tc find a
civilian job that uses the skills in Z2H. military career;
field?
Mo chance (0 in 10)
Very slight possibility (1 in 10
Sligh- possibility (2 in 10)
Some possibility (3 in 10)
Fair possibility (4 in 10)
Fairly good possibility (5 in 10)
Good possibility (6 in 10)
Probable (7 in 10)
Very probable (8 in 10)
Almost sure (9 in 10)













101 . Again, suppose that you were to leave the service NOW
to take a civilian job. In what stite or country would you
probably live? PL5ASE CHECK THE LIST OF STATS AND FOREIGN
COUNTI^Y CODES IN QUESTION 6 AND RECORD THE NAME OF THE
LOCATION AND r^S TSO^DIDI? CODE NUMBER BELOW.
I never thought about a location 73
I*d go wherever I could fini a job 77
NAME 0? SrATE/COUNTR? CODE*
102. If you were to leave the service NOW and .ks
civilian job, how do you think the job would compare with




civilian Job Would Be A Lot Better A.
Civilian Job Woald Be Slightly Better B.
About the Same in a Civilian and military Job C.
Civilian Job Would Be Slightly Worse D.
Civilian Job Would Be A Lot Worse E.
WORK CONDITIONS A B C D
The immediate supervisors X X X X X
Having a say in what happens t.o me X X X X X
The retirement benefits X X X X X
The medical benefits X X X X T
The chance for
interesting and challenging work X X X X X
The wages and salaries X X X X X
The chance for promotion X X X X X
The opportunities for training X X X X X
The people I work with X X X X X
the work schedule and hours of work X X X X X
The job security X X X X X
The eguipment I would use on the job _X X X X X
The location of the iob X X X X X
103. Suppose you left the service NOW. How do you think
the total military compensation you are receiveing now (pay
and benefits) would compare with the total compensation (pay
and benefits) you would receive in a civilian job? (^ark
one)
A lot more in the military
A little more in the military
About the same in a military and civilian job.
A little more in civilian life








I have r.o idea what I could earn in civilian life 06
10U. Hew much do you agree or disagree with each




NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE,
DISAGREE
STRONGLY DISAGREE
A. Life in the military is about
what I expected it to be 1 2 3 4 5
B. Military personnel in the
future will not have as
good retirement benefits
as I have now 1 2 3 (4 5
C. My military pay and
benefits will not keep up
with inflation 1 2 3 '4 5
D. ily family would be better
off if I took
a civilian job 1 2 3 a 5
105. New, taking all things together, how satisfied or
dissatisfied are you with the military as a way of life?
Mark the number which shows your opinion.
Very Dissatisfied Verv Satisfied
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
106, Record the time now- enter military hour:
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107. How long did it take yoa to complete zhLs question-
naire?
# of minutss
108. Did you complaxe this survey luring a group adminis-
tration where other peopla were taking *he same survey?
Ye s 1
No
109. Did you complete this survey on your own (off-duty)
time or while on^dutv?
Off- Dut y 1
On-D uty 2
Part while on-duty and
part while off-duty 3
110. We're interested in any comments or recommendations
you would like to make about military policias--whether or
not the topic was covered in this survey. Do you have any
comments?
Yes Specify in Space Below 1
No
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